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TOTH, JEFFREY P., Ph.D. The Effect of Semantic Encoding on 
Unconscious Retrieval Processes. (1990) 
Directed by Dr. R. Reed Hunt. 126 pp. 
The purpose of the present research was to investigate 
the conditions under which unconscious retrieval processes 
would show sensitivity to semantic encoding operations. In 
three experiments, subjects studied word-lists either 
semantically or non-semantically. Experiment 1 used 
categorized lists and tested for retention using word-
fragment completion. Experiments 2 and 3 used unrelated 
words, presented visually and aurally at study, and tested 
for recognition memory using a response signal ("deadline") 
procedure in an attempt prevent the use of conscious 
retrieval strategies. In both experiments, target words 
were presented visually at test and target-signal delays 
were 500 ms and 1500 ms. In Experiment 2 subjects were 
directed to respond positively ("yes") ·to all previously 
presented words. In Experiment 3 subjects were directed to 
respond negatively to words previously presented in the 
visual modality. 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that encoding 
operations directed toward the categorical nature of the 
word-lists facilitated performance in fragment completion 
more than a pleasantness rating task and a non-semantic 
letter-scanning task. Categorical encoding also resulted in 
performance facilitation on non-presented category 
exemplars. On a subsequent free recall task, pleasantness 
rating resulted in the highest level of performance. 
Experiment 2 showed that retrieval times under 1000 ms 
were associated with a significant modality effect which was 
eliminated by 2000 ms. However, the effect of orienting 
task was reliable at both points in the recognition process. 
Experiment 3 showed that semantic encoding resulted in 
a higher level of false recognitions than non-semantic 
encoding when retrieval time was restricted. By 2000 ms, 
the ability to reject previously presented words was 
equivalent for the two study orientations. 
The present results suggest that unconscious retrieval 
processes are affected by prior conceptual operations. On 
memory tests which do not make reference to a prior study 
experience, the effect is dependent on contextual similarity 
between encoding and retrieval conditions. On memory tests 
which do make reference to a prior event, unconscious 
processes are influenced by both prior perceptual and 
conceptual operations. 'rhe results are discussed in terms 
of current theoretical approaches to the nature of conscious 
and unconscious processes supporting memory performance. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
The distinction between implicit and explicit 
remembering has become a central issue in memory research 
(Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Schacter, 1987). 
Explicit memory refers to the conscious recollection of a 
prior experience. Tests such as free recall and recognition 
are called explicit because they include instructions for 
the subject to consciously bring to mind an event in their 
past. Implicit memory, on the other hand, refers to 
situations in which a persons' current behavior is 
influenced by a past event, but the person is not aware of 
that event nor does she intend to "remember" it. 
Instructions on implicit memory tests do not refer to the 
past; subjects are engaged in a perceptual or problem-
solving task and retention is measured (inferred) from the 
facilitation in performance attributable to a specific prior 
experience. The development of experimental tasks which do 
not require conscious recollection has allowed researchers 
to consider the role of unconscious processes in memory. 
Table 1 shows some of the characteristics that are 
believed to distinguish these two forms of memory. Of most 
theoretical importance are the three characteristics listed 
2 
Table 1. A summary of the characteristics assumed to 
distinguish implicit and explicit memory. 
Form of Memory: 
Measure 
(operationally 
defined): 
Tests (e.g. ) : 
Descriptions: 
Type of Process: 
Mode of Retrieval: 
Representation 
(or Process) 
Mediating 
Performance: 
Implicit 
* Indirect 
* Stem Completion 
* Word Identification 
* Memory without 
awareness 
* Memory. as 
a tool 
* Unconscious 
(automatic) 
* Unintentional 
* Perceptual 
Explicit 
* Direct 
* Free Recall 
* Recognition 
* Memory with 
awareness 
* Memory as 
an object 
* Conscious 
(controlled) 
* Intentional 
* Conceptual 
3 
at the bottom. First, it is thought that implicit memory 
relies on unconscious processes whereas explicit memory 
relies on conscious processes. Second, the retrieval of 
information acquired in the past is thought to be 
unintentional during the operation of implicit memory, but 
explicit memory appears to require a deliberate, intentional 
act. Finally, the type of representation mediating 
performance is thought to be perceptual in the case of 
implicit memory, and conceptual in explicit memory. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the distinction 
between implicit and explicit memory is their capacity to be 
dissociated as a function of experimental manipulations. 
Dissociation refers to the situation in which a particular 
variabl~ produces an effect on one type of memory test 
(e.g., free recall) but no effect, or an opposite effect, on 
another type (e.g., perceptual identification). Research to 
date has shown that implicit and explicit memory can be 
dissociated in at least four ways. (1) Explicit memory is 
severely impaired in amnesia; implicit memory is often 
equivalent to that of normal populations (Graf, Squire, & 
Mandler, 1984). (2) Explicit memory appears to vary with 
the amount of semantic elaboration performed at encoding; 
implicit memory appears insensitive to semantic processing 
(Graf & Mandler, 1984; Jacoby, 1983a, 1983b; Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981). (3) Study-test changes in surface 
information (e.g., modality of presentation) have little 
effect on explicit memory; implicit memory is severely 
attenuated by such changes (Graf, Sh~amura, & Squire, 1985; 
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987a). (~) 
Explicit memory for an event declines with the passage of 
time; implicit memory remains relatively intact across 
comparable time intervals (Sloman, Hayman, Ohta, Law, & 
Tulving, 1988; Tulving, Schacter, & Stark, 1982). 
Currently, there are two major theoretical approaches 
to explaining these effects, the multiple memory systems 
view, of which there are a number of variations (Cohen, 
198~; Johnson, 1983; Tulving, 1983, 1985; Tulving & 
Schacter, 1990), and the processing view (Roediger & 
Blaxton, 1987b; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989; see also 
Jacoby, 1983a). The memory systems view is a structuralist 
approach and basically proposes that different memory tasks 
access different underlying systems. The processing view is 
a more functional approach and suggests that memory be 
understood in terms of data-driven and conceptually-driven 
processes. 
Although these two competing approaches explain 
dissociations very differently, it is interesting to note 
that they share two fundamental assumptions. - The first is 
that priming is perceptual. In memory systems terminology 
(Tulving & Schacter, 1990), priming is mediated by the 
perceptual representation system (PRS), a "presemantic" 
system which does not store conceptual information. In the 
5 
processing approach (Roediger, 1990), priming is due to the 
transfer of data-driven processes. A second, more tacit, 
assumption is that specific tests tap specific systems or 
processes. For example, recognition is said to tap episodic 
memory; perceptual identification is said to primarily 
require data-driven processes. 
Problems ~ 1h§ Distinction between 
Implicit gng ExPlicit Memory 
As noted in recent reviews (Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 
1988; Schacter, 1987) no one theoretical approach can 
sufficiently account for the dissociations identified above. 
Current difficulties in understanding the nature of implicit 
memory and its relationship to explicit memory may stem from 
two related issues. The first concerns the variety of 
retention measures used to study these forms of memory. A 
partial list of measures referred to as implicit would 
include word-fragment completion (Tulving, Schacter, & 
Stark, 1982), word-stem completion (Graf & Schacter, 1985; 
Schacter & Graf, 1986), the reading of altered text (Kolers, 
1976; Masson & Sala, 1978), perceptual identification 
(Jacoby, 1983a, 1983b; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), lexical 
decision (Smith, MacLeod, Bain, & Hoppe, 1989), and category 
production (Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 1985). What relates 
these measures is the fact that task instructions do not 
make reference to past events (note 1). Nevertheless, there 
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are theoretical as well as empirical reasons for believing 
that each of these measures involves different component 
processes (see e.g., Hunt & Toth, 1990; Levy & Kirsner, 
1989; Roediger & Srinivas, & Weldon, 1989; Witherspoon & 
Moscovitch, 1989). At present, it is unclear whether 
similarities 
account for 
in instructions or in component processes 
the dissociations between these measures and 
explicit memory. 
A related issue which may underlie current theoretical 
difficulties concerns the nature of psychological processes 
that can potentially fall under the rubric of "implicit 
memory." Presumably, the main reason for interest in 
implicit measures is the notion that they assess unconscious 
processes. But the conditions for demonstrating the 
influence of unconscious processes are not entirely clear. 
Schacter (1987) states· that "implicit memory is revealed 
when previous experiences facilitate performance on a task 
that does not require conscious or intentional recollection 
of those experiences" (p. 501). This definition appears to 
treat awareness and intention as a single process, or as two 
processes which invariably occur together. 
The use of the terms "implicit" and "explicit" have 
been used to refer to both test instructions and 
hypothetical forms of memory. This has led some researchers 
to use the terms "direct" and "indirect" which can be 
operationally defined in terms of task instructions and 
measurement criteria 
Klavehn and Bjork 
(note 2 ) . As noted 
(1988), when the terms 
7 
by Richardson-
implicit and 
explicit are used as descriptions of both task instructions 
and forms of memory, unwarranted assumptions are made 
conc~rning the roles of intentionality and awareness in 
memory. As will become apparent, the confounding of these 
two psychological phenomena is one of the main reasons for 
questioning the validity of the implicit/explicit 
distinction. Indeed, the present experiments, as well as 
others reviewed below (General Discussion), provide strong 
evidence that unconscious influences of memory can occur in 
the presence of awareness and intention. Additionally, 
evidence is marshalled that so-called "implicit measures of 
memory" often recruit consciously-controlled processes. If 
correct, these observations suggest that the terms implicit 
and explicit do not identify mutually exclusive forms of 
memory; rather, they can be viewed as very general and, in a 
sense, overlapping terms referring to a number of 
psychological processes which interact to produce 
performance. 
The research presented here is based on three 
assumptions that differ substantially from those underlying 
the theoretical positions outlined above. First, 
performance facilitation resulting from a specific prior 
experience 
to context 
(cf. 
and 
"priming") is assumed to be very sensitive 
meaning (i.e., to prior conceptual 
processes). 
essentially, 
taken into 
8 
The argument for this assumption is, 
that current theoretical approaches have not 
account the crucial role played by retrieval 
environments in mediating performance on indirect measures. 
Contrary to these approaches, performance on both direct and 
indirect measures is assumed to involve the recruitment of 
both perceptual and conceptual representations (or 
processes). This assumption can be viewed as the main 
impetus for the present experiments; the rationale 
underlying it is presented in more detail below. The second 
assumption underlying the present approach is that all 
memory tests, whether "implicit" or "explicit," involve a 
mixture of processes, both conscious and unconscious in 
nature. This assumption suggests that the presumed 
correspondence between "form of memory" (implicit/ explicit) 
and type of psychological processes (unconscious/ conscious) 
is inaccurate. The third assumption is that unconscious 
influences of memory can occur, indeed typically occur, in 
the presence of awareness and intention (cf. Table 1). The 
results of the experiments presented here are consistent 
with each of these assumptions and suggest that the 
separation of implicit and explicit memory as depicted in 
Table 1 misrepresents the nature of memory. 
9 
~ ~ Qf Context in Mediating Memory 
Two of the most important ideas for understanding 
memory performance on direct tests are the processes of 
organization and elaboration. Organization is recognized as 
one of the dominant principles of memory; retrieval of 
specific items is facilitated by accessing the integrated 
whole of which these items are a part (Puff, 1979; Tulving & 
Donaldson, 1972). If an encoded feature is common to an 
otherwise unrelated set of items, accessing that feature 
will facilitate retrieval of the set. Alternatively, 
research within the levels-of-processing framework (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972) emphasized the notion of elaboration (Craik 
& Tulving, 1975); memory will benefit to the extent that the 
to-be-remembered item is related to other information stored 
in memory. Similar to organization, elaborative processing 
is assumed to faciliatate memory by increasing the number 
and effectiveness of potential retrieval cues. Unlike 
organization, however, elaboration involves the encoding of 
features not shared by other encoded items (Lockhart, Craik, 
& Jacoby, 1976). Thus, elaboration serves to make 
particular items distinctive in the context of the episode 
in which they were originally embedded (Jacoby & Craik, 
1979). 
Organization and elaboration have been highly 
successful in accounting for a variety of memory phenomena 
as assessed by direct measures (see Einstein & Hunt, 1980; 
Hunt 
using 
this 
& Einstein, 
indirect 
tradition. 
10 
1981). However, contemporary research 
measures represents a significant break in 
The reason for this break appears to be 
based on the fact that organization and elaboration are 
psychological processes performed on the meanings of events. 
Performance on indirect measures appears relatively 
insensitive to manipulations of meaning. In comparison to 
non-semantic processing, semantic elaboration produces no 
subsequent benefit in performance on indirect measures (Graf 
& Mandler, 198~; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Additionally, 
performance on indirect tests has been found to be highly 
dependent on the preservation of specific perceptual details 
from study to test (Graf, Shirnamura, & Squire, 1985; Jacoby 
& Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Hayman, 1987; Roediger & Blaxton, 
1987a). These findings have led to the assumption that 
unconscious retrieval processes respond only to perceptual 
information whereas conscious processes reflect conceptual 
(meaning-based) information. 
There are studies, however, that have reported effects 
of conceptual encoding operations on indirect measures 
(Blaxton, 1989; Gardiner, 1989; Hirshman, Snodgrass, Mindes, 
& Feenan, 1990; Toth & Hunt, 1990). These studies resist 
integration into current theoretical systems because they 
appear to show that, under some circumstances, unconscious 
retrieval processes can be affected by encoding operations 
directed toward the meaning of study material. What could 
11 
account for these anomalous findings? 
One explanation concerns the nature of retrieval 
environments in which indirect memory performance is 
assessed. As discussed by Jacoby and Craik (1979), 
elaborative encoding may only be effective if the original 
study context is recovered at test. Elaboration serves to 
increase the distinctiveness of a particular item, but 
distinctiveness is "context-relative"; it can only be 
assessed in terms of the information available in the 
original encoding episode. The effective context in which 
memory occurs is a function of the retrieval environment, 
the cues given in a task, and, most importantly, the task 
instructions. On direct tests, retrieval cues (including 
instructions) directly reference the target episode; thus, 
the original context can be intentionally recreated by the 
subject. On indirect tests, the target episode is not 
directly referenced; it can therefore be assumed that 
subjects do not attempt to recover the original study 
context. Thus, semantic elaboration may often appear 
irrelevant to performance on indirect measures because the 
retrieval environment shares little relationship with the 
context in which study items were 
This suggests that to observe the 
originally processed. 
effects of semantic 
operations on indirect tests, a processing context similar 
to that available at encoding must be created in the 
retrieval environment. 
12 
The typical procedure in an "implicit" memory 
experiment is to present subjects with a unrelated set of 
words which are differentially processed according to the 
variable of interest. This study phase is then followed by 
presentation of an indirect retention test. Test lists are 
composed of a subset of the input words randomly mixed with 
additional unrelated words. Jacoby (1983b) and others have 
suggested that, if a word were to be tested in the context 
in which it was studied, performance on indirect tests may 
come to rely on conceptual processes. In fact, Jacoby 
(1983b; Allen & Jacoby, 1990) demonstrated that performance 
in word identification is enhanced when the test list 
contains 90%, as opposed to 10%, of the previously studied 
words. 
However, amidst the large research literature using 
indirect- measures, only a handful of experiments have 
attempted to explicate such contextual factors. Mandler, 
Graf, and Kraft (1986) embedded target words in categorized 
lists at encoding, but memory for these targets was assessed 
in the usual set of unrelated words and no effects of 
semantic orientation were found. The few experiments which 
have reinstated the encoding context at retrieval all show 
effects of prior conceptual processing (Franks, Plybon, & 
Auble, 1982; Hannigan, Shelton, Franks, & Bransford, 1980; 
Kasserman, Yearwood, & Franks, 1987; Toth & Hunt, 1990; 
Winnick & Daniel, 1970). Each of these studies used 
13 
perceptual measures of retention which are associated with 
operation of "implicit" memory; however, only Toth and Hunt 
(1990) used indirect instructions. It would therefore seem 
that the role of retrieval contexts as a factor mediating 
performance on indirect measures has been relatively 
ignored. 
The present approach contends that, by 
using unrelated word lists and encoding tasks 
exclusively 
that bear 
little similarity to retrieval tasks, 
of implicit memory underestimate the 
contemporary studies 
extent to which 
unconscious retrieval processes are sensitive to prior 
conceptual processes. It is hypothesized that reinstating 
aspects of the encoding context at retrieval can provide an 
environment in which prior semantic processing becomes 
evident. This hypothesis is congruent with the notion of 
transfer appropriate processing (Morris, 
Franks, 1977) but extends the notion of 
Bransford, & 
transfer beyond 
perceptual similarity to include conceptual/meaningful 
operations (see Adams et al., 1988; Lockhart et al., 1988; 
Toth & Hunt, 1990). 
A Unified Theory of Implicit and Explicit Memory 
The present approach is guided by the notion that 
performance on direct and indirect measures can be explained 
by a common set of theoretical principles. However, a 
unified theory of memory is thwarted by assumptions that the 
1q. 
processes underlying performance on direct and indirect 
tests are fundamentally different; that is, that "implicit" 
and "explicit" memory are mutually exclusive categories 
defined by the dichotomies of psychological process, intent, 
and type of representation mediating performance (see Table 
1). These assumptions are encouraged by the dissociations 
found between direct and indirect measures. The result has 
been the development of theoretical systems which propose 
that performance on direct and indirect measures is mediated 
by different processes (e.g., data-driven and conceptually 
driven: Roediger & Blaxton, 1987b) or memory systems 
(Tulving & Schacter, 1990). Dissociations represent 
important data which must be explained by any satisfactory 
theory of memory. However, dissociations between memory 
tests do not necessarily mean that the processes underlying 
performance on the two tests are fundamentally different; 
rather, they may simply indicate that the type of 
information required on the two tests differs (Levy & 
Kirsner, 1989; Shoben & Ross, 1976). 
The assumption of an absolute difference between memory 
tests is analogous to assumptions concerning encoding 
operations made during the development of the levels-of-
processing model. Underlying the levels-of-processing 
framework was the assumption that "deep," semantic processes 
support 
processes 
better 
(Craik 
retention than 
& Lockhart, 
"shallow," 
1972). 
non-semantic 
However, as 
15 
demonstrated by Stein (1978) and others (e.g., Hunt & 
·Mitchell, 1978; 1982), nonsemantic processing can be crucial 
to explicit memory performance if the test requires access 
to nonsemantic features. The present work hypothesizes that 
an analogous situation exists in the study of implicit 
memory; current approaches assume that perceptual encoding 
processes are sufficient to maximize performance on indirect 
~ 
measures. This may be an artifact, produced by the 
consistent use of unrelated word lists and incompatible 
tasks. Semantic processes are crucial to performance on 
indirect tests; however, these processes will only be 
apparent in retrieval environments which are contextually 
similar to the original episode in which those processes 
were used. 
The experiments reported here were primarily designed 
to investigate the effects of prior conceptual operations on 
unconscious retrieval processes. Finding conceptual effects 
would not only broaden the hypothesized scope of unconscious 
processes in memory; it also has the potential of uniting 
conscious and unconscious processes under a single set of 
theoretical principles. In contrast to conceptualizing 
memory performance in terms of one type of psychological 
process or one form of representation, all episodes of 
remembering may involve conscious and unconscious processes, 
~d the interaction of perceptual and conceptual 
representations. If so, the phenomena associated with 
16 
"implicit" memory could be described by established 
psychological principles such as organization, elaboration, 
and distinctiveness. 
One method for studying unconscious retrieval is to use 
indirect retention measures. This method relies on the 
popular assumption that retention measures are pure with 
regard to the psychological processes they evoke. The 
problem with this assumption is that there are reasons to 
believe that indirect measures do not always assess 
"implicit" memory. There are many opportunities for a 
subject to use intentional strategies on indirect measures 
and these strategies can easily go undetected. 
Nevertheless, Experiment 1 investigated the effects of 
semantic and non-semantic study orientation on fragment 
completion; this measure was chosen because it has been used 
extensively to assess "implicit" memory. An alternative 
method for studying unconscious processes in memory is to 
assume that all retention measures involve both conscious 
and unconscious components. If this assumption is correct, 
it should be possible to isolate the unconscious processes 
contributing to performance on a direct test. This strategy 
was used in Experiments 2 and 3 which also manipulated 
orienting task, but assessed performance in recognition 
memory using a response signal procedure (Reed, 1973, 1976) 
in an attempt to separate conscious from unconscious 
retrieval processes. 
·····--·-····-- -·---- ------------
CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1 
17 
An influential study in the delineation of implicit 
memory was published by Winnick and Daniel in 1970. This 
research is usually cited by contemporary researchers 
because of their Experiment 2 which demonstrated that 
tachistoscopic thresholds (a measure used to study implicit 
memory) are sensitive to the form in which a word is 
presented at encoding. That is, if a word is to be visually 
identified, visual presentation of that word at encoding 
provides for more positive transfer at test than does 
presentation of the word's referent (i.e., a picture) or the 
word's definition. This is an important finding, given 
current attempts to understand the nature of implicit 
memory. However, whereas Winnick and Daniel's Experiment 2 
produced results consistent with current accounts of 
implicit memory, their Experiment 1 produced a finding which 
is not as easily incorporated into those accounts. That 
experiment demonstrated that words not presented at 
encoding, but drawn from the same "set" as the presented 
words (i.e., the States of the Union), may be identified 
more readily than matched control words. This finding 
clashes with current theoretical approaches which uniformly 
18 
"priming" effects with perceptual processes identify 
(Roediger, 1990). Winnick and Daniel's (1970) study 
suggests 
affected 
that 
by the 
unconscious retrieval processes 
conceptual information conveyed 
retrieval environment. 
can 
in 
be 
the 
The present experiment can be viewed as an extension of 
Winnick and Daniel (1970, Experiment 1) in the context of 
current methodological approaches to implicit memory. The 
goal was to demonstrate an effect of semantic processing on 
an indirect measure, and to demonstrate "memory" for 
information not physically present in the encoding 
environment. Orienting task (semantic versus nonsemantic) 
was manipulated at encoding and categorized lists were used 
to provide a conceptual structure which could be re-
presented at test. Memory was tested using fragment-
completion (e.g., C-A-P-G-E as a cue for CHAMPAGNE), a 
retention measure which has been extensively studied. It 
was hypothesized that performance on the indirect measure of 
fragment completion would show sensitivity to encoding 
operations when the retrieval environment was contextually 
similar to the encoding environment. 
Demonstrating memory for information not physically 
present at encoding may appear paradoxical. However, it has 
been known for some time that experiencing a familiar event 
or concept implicitly "activates" associatively related 
concepts (Cofer, 1967; Cramer, 196~, 1966). Implicitly 
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activated associates have been shown to lead to false 
recognitions (Underwood, 1965) and recall intrusions (Deese, 
1959). Recent work by Nelson and colleagues has been 
directed toward uncovering variables (e.g., associative set-
size) which affect "memory" for a word's associates (Nelson, 
Bajo, McEnvoy, & Schreiber, 1999) and the conditions under 
which implicit activation may have positive or negative 
consequences for memory performance (Nelson, McEnvoy, & 
Schreiber, 1990). All of these studies suggest that 
implicitly activated associates form part of the original or 
"target" episode. 
In terms of direct retention measures, implicitly 
activated information may be viewed as interfering with 
accurate retrieval. However, indirect measures do not 
require awareness of the prior event; from the subjects 
perspective, "correct performance" is defined in terms of 
the task at hand. This focus blurs the distinction between 
presented and non-presented information; both become valid 
sources of information if they facilitate performance. To 
the extent that implicitly activated information can affect 
performance on an indirect retention measure, "memory" has 
been demonstrated. Showing that such effects are modulated 
by specific forms of study processing would constitute 
another source of evidence that unconscious retrieval 
processes are sensitive to previous conceptual operations. 
Study materials consisted of ~ exemplars from each of ~ 
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taxonomic categories. At test, fragments of these 16 
("Old") items were presented along with 32 unstudied items. 
Sixteen of the unstudied items consisted of t. ("New") 
exemplars taken from each of t. categories not represented in 
the original study list. The remaining unstudied items 
were drawn from the same taxonomic categories represented in 
the study list (l.l. exemplars from each category: "Exemplar"). 
These i·tems were included to assess whether implicit 
activation is affected by study orientation (see Cofer, 
1967; Cramer, 196l.l., 1966). Thus, New items provided a 
baseline measure of performance, Old items a measure of 
"repetition priming", and Exemplar items a measure of 
"indirect priming" due to implicit activation. 
At encoding, different groups of subjects performed one 
of three orienting tasks: (1) Category-classification (CC), 
in which the subject named the category from which the 
exemplar was drawn; (2) Pleasantness rating (PR), in which 
the subject rated the idiosyncratic pleasantness of the 
meaning of each word; (3) Letter-scanning (LS), in which the 
subject identified and recorded lower-case letters in the 
target word (as descibed below, target words were presented 
in mixed-case) . 
The Category-classification and Pleasantness rating 
tasks were designed to encourage semantic processing of the 
study words. Based on previous research (Einstein & Hunt, 
1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981), the nature of that processing 
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is assumed to differ as a function of specific semantic 
orientation. Category classification is a variation of the 
sorting procedure used by Hunt and colleagues and is assumed 
to evoke relational processing of words from a single 
category. In line with the implicit activation literature 
cited above, this procedure was also expected to result in 
the activation of non-presented category members. The 
Pleasantness rating task requires that the presented word be 
considered in relation to other knowledge not necessarily 
related to categorical membership. This task was thus 
assumed to result in a more distinct or item-specific 
encoding than the category-classification task. The Letter-
scanning task was a typical non-semantic orienting task 
designed to encourage relatively superficial processing of 
the study words. A number of studies to date have 
demonstrated that such non-semantic orientation produces 
performance equivalent to that of semantic orientation on 
indirect measures (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). However, 
as noted in the introduction, these studies have invariably 
used unrelated stimulus materials. 
A particularly tricky issue in implicit memory research 
concerns whether subjects truly retrieve information 
unintentionally at the time of test (see Schacter, 1987; 
Schacter, Bowers, & Booker, 1989). Because the study 
material can potentially be accessed intentionally, it is 
possible that subjects may adopt conscious retrieval 
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strategies. The usual approach to this problem is to either 
(1) present the indirect test as one of several filler tasks 
(e.g., Gardiner, 1989; Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 198~) or (2) 
provide explicit instructions that subjects should (a) 
attempt to complete all test items (e.g., Gardiner, 1988; 
Gardiner, Dawson, & Sutton, 1989), and/or (b) respond "with 
the first word that comes to mind" (e.g., Schwartz, 1989). 
Based on previous research (Graf & Mandler, 198~; Roediger, 
Srinivas, & Weldon, 1989; Schacter & Graf, 1986) it would 
appear that these methods succeed in eliminating conscious 
retrieval strategies; differential effects of study 
variables are found when identical test cues are provided 
and only the nature of the test instructions (direct or 
indirect) differ. In the present study, both methods 
described above were used. In addition, subjects were 
allowed only one attempt to "solve" a particular test item 
within a limited response interval (10 seconds). The 
combination of these instructional constraints was expected 
to reduce the amount of strategic, reconstructive processes 
involved in the retrieval process. 
However, the problem of ensuring an "implicit" 
retrieval mode was particularly acute in the present 
experiment because of the semantic effects predicted. Such 
effects are typically taken as prima facie evidence for 
explicit remembering (see Roediger et al., 1989). 
Experiment 1 attempted to counter this objection by also 
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assessing explicit memory. Previous research (Einstein & 
Hunt, 1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981) has shown that 
distinctive processing of related items produces higher 
levels of explicit memory (free recall) than relational 
processing. Thus, if category-classification produces 
greater fragment completion performance than pleasantness 
rating, and if this order of performance is reversed in free 
recall, we would have converging evidence that subjects 
adopted an implicit retrieval mode. 
To summarize, the present experiment attempted to 
demonstrate that performance on fragment completion can show 
sensitivity to encoding operations when the retrieval 
environment is contextually similar to the encoding 
environment. Context can be conceptualized in a number of 
ways. Typically, the role of context in mediating memory 
performance is studied by manipulating the cues paired with 
study and test items (as, for example, in A-B, C-A designs). 
In these studies, context is conceptualized in terms of 
individual test items. However, context can also be viewed 
in terms of an entire task. For example, in Jacoby (1983a) 
the role of context was studied by manipulating the 
composition of test lists. That is, different groups of 
subjects were tested using lists containing different ratios 
of studied ("old") and non-studied ("new") items. Allen and 
Jacoby (1990) have shown that the enhancement in memory 
performance associated with reinstating study context is not 
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the result of intentional retrieval strategies. Thus, the 
role of context in these studies can be conceptualized in 
terms of the overall processing demands made at study and 
test. 
Experiment 1 attempted to show the importance of 
reinstating processing demands by usin~ categorized lists 
and orienting tasks which emphasized different aspects of 
study items. Unlike the experiments described above 
(Jacoby, 1983a; Allen & Jacoby, 1990), the ratio of old and 
new items was the same for all groups. Thus, contextual 
reinstatement was in terms of processing demands that is, 
the extent to which the processes engaged at study were also 
required at retrieval. It was hypothesized that an 
orienting task which emphasized categorical information 
(i.e., Category-classification) would result in more 
positive transfer to a categorically structured test, in 
comparison to orienting tasks which did not emphasize this 
type of information. 
Method 
Design. equipment. and subjects 
The experiment was designed as a 3 x 3 mixed factorial 
with orienting task (Category-classification, Pleasantness 
rating, Letter-scanning) as a between-subjects variable and 
test-item status (Old, Exemplar, New) as a within-subjects 
variable. The performance measures were accuracy and 
completion time. Completion times can be used as a measure 
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of study facilitation and thus may reveal the effects of 
elaborative processing in the absence of effects on 
accuracy. All stimuli were presented on a monochrome CRT 
(Arndek video-300). When response time was measured, 
subjects responded verbally; this triggered a Coulbourn 
voice switch (model 528-2~) connected to a Tecmar Labtender 
in an IBM-XT. Seventy-two undergraduates, enrolled in 
introductory psychology classes, participated for course 
credit. 
Materials 
Eight exemplars from each of 8 categories were drawn 
from the Battig and Montague (1969) norms of free 
associations to category superordinates. 
were separated into two groups (A and 
The 8 
B) and 
categories 
exemplars 
within a category were separated into two sets (1 and 2). 
Based on the rank order of exemplar production (Battig & 
Montague, 1969), sets contained an equal number of high- and 
low-production exemplars. This arrangement allowed lists to 
be constructed (A1, A2, B1, and B2) and rotated through 
conditions such that all items served an equal number of 
times in each role (old, exemplar, and new). 
Study lists contained 16 items; ~ exemplars from each 
of ~ categories. Test lists contained ~8 word fragments 
corresponding to critical items; 16 
exemplars, and 16 items from nonstudied 
old, 16 nonstudied 
categories. With 
26 
few exceptions, fragments contained the first letter of the 
word and were created by removing every other letter, with 
the restriction that the resulting fragment had only one 
completion. Thus, on average, fragments contained an equal 
number of letters and blanks. 
The stimuli for all groups were constructed such that 
the letters to be provided in the subsequent fragment 
completion test were the same as those in upper-case in the 
study word (e.g., the study word for the test fragment T-U-
P-T was TrUmPeT). As discussed above, the Letter-scanning 
task is a non-semantic orienting task designed to provide 
relatively superficial processing of the study words. 
Compared to a semantic orientation, such tasks typically 
produce poor performance on direct retention measures but 
equivalent performance on indirect measures. However, given 
the categorized structure of the study and test lists, we 
expected the letter task to produce relatively poor 
performance, even on the indirect measure. Thus, the 
Letter-scanning task was designed to provide as much useful 
information as possible without evoking semantic processing. 
The use of upper-case letters emphasized the stimulus 
pattern that would later have to be completed. The complete 
set of critical stimulus materials is presented in Appendix 
1. 
Both 
exception 
study and test lists were randomized 
that all categories represented (for 
with the 
the study 
~- ~-~~ ~~~ ----~--- ------ -~------------ ·----
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list) and all test conditions appeared once before any was 
repeated. Because of the nature of the Letter-scanning task 
(see below), words were presented at study in mixed-case 
(e.g., "eXaMpLe") for all groups. 
Procedure 
For all subjects, the sequence of events was identical 
except for the orienting task. The sequence was as follows: 
(1) timed generation of surnames given a first name; (2) 
timed generation of cities given a state; (3) presentation 
of study list with appropriate orienting task; (~) free 
recall of states (USA); (5) fragment completion test; (6) 
free recall of study list. Tasks 1, 2, and ~ were filler 
tasks designed to disguise the indirect retention measure. 
In addition, tasks 1 and 2 were designed to provide subjects 
with practice on the reaction time task. All orienting 
tasks, to be described below, were incidental with respect 
to memory; no mention was made of the ensuing retention 
tests. 
minutes. 
The entire procedure lasted approximately ~0 
Category-classification (CC). Subjects were informed that 
the task involved speed and accuracy in classifying category 
exemplars; their task was to name the category from which 
the item was drawn. They were also told about the form in 
which words were to be presented (i.e., mixed-case). An 
index card with labels of the four study categories was 
28 
affixed under the computer screen for reference during the 
task. A trial began with the presentation of a set of 
arrows indicating the future location of the "test" item. 
Following a variable interval (500 to 1500 msec), a category 
exemplar in mixed-case was presented. As soon as the voice 
key had been triggered by the subjects response the item 
disappeared. A set of arrows for the next stimulus 
presentat·ion appeared following a 1000 msec interval. To 
ensure relational processing, subjects were instructed to 
continue watching the CRT following list presentation for 
feedback on their performance; all study items were then 
presented 
appropriate 
category. 
on the CRT in upper-case letters with 
category label and average reaction times 
an 
per 
Pleasantness rating (PR). Presentation of study items was 
the same as in the category-classification task except for 
the following. (1) The message "PLEASANTNESS?" appeared 
under the item after a delay of 1000 msec. Subjects were 
instructed to judge the pleasantness of the meaning of each 
word and were provided with a five-point scale (1 = 
unpleasant, 3 =neutral, 5 =pleasant). Judgements were 
entered on the computer keyboard. (2) Items remained on the 
screen until the subject had entered a rating. 
were not re-presented at the end of the list. 
(3) Items 
Letter-scanning (LS). Presentation of study items was the 
~ ~ -~~~~~-~~ ~--~~--~~-------~------
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same as in the pleasantness rating task except instead of 
the message "PLEASANTNESS?", the message "LETTERS?" appeared 
followed by the message "DIFFICULTY?" after a delay of 500 
msec. Subjects were informed that the task involved judging 
the difficulty of reading words presented in mixed-case. 
They were instructed to (1) type in all the letters which 
were in lower-case to the prompt "LETTERS?" and (b) judge 
the relative difficulty of reading the word using a five 
point scale which was provided (1 =easy, 5 =difficult). 
Each trial on the fragment completion test consisted of 
the presentation of a single fragment. Subjects were told 
that. the task involved completing words with missing 
letters. No mention was made of the pior study experience. 
Subjects were allowed 10 seconds in which to produce a 
completion. A trial began with the presentation of a set of 
arrows indicating the future location of the test item. One 
second later, a fragment was presented. The computer screen 
was cleared immediately after a response was given or at the 
end of the 10 second trial. All responses were recorded by 
the experimenter. As soon as the voice key had been 
triggered by the subjects response the item disappeared. A 
set of arrows for the next stimulus presentation appeared 
following a 1000 msec interval. 
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Results 
Unless specified, the terms "significant" and 
"reliable" are based on an alpha level of .05. 
Fragment completion 
Accuracy. The percentage of correct completions as a 
function of orienting task (CC, PR, LS) and test-item (Old, 
Exemplar, New) are presented in Table 2. Table 2 also 
contains facilitation scores (cf. "priming") for the Old and 
Exemplar conditions; this score can be viewed as measuring 
the effects of the prior study experience and is computed 
for each subject by subtracting performance on New items 
from that on Old and Exemplar items. A separate analysis of 
variance CANOVA) was performaned on both measures (i.e., 
overall performance and facilitation). 
Analysis of overall performance showed a main effect of 
test-item, F(2,138)=110.9, MSe=.018, p < .0001. The Least 
Significant Difference (LSD) for comparisons among means was 
.0~~. Thus, old items (.68) were completed significantly 
more often than Exemplar items(.~~) which, in turn, were 
completed more often than New items (.37). Collapsing 
across orienting tasks, this effect suggests that the study 
manipulation was successful; in relation to New items both 
Old and Exemplar items showed significant facilitation. The 
main effect of orienting task did not reach significance, 
F=l. ~1. 
( . 52) 
T-tests (LSD) revealed a difference only between CC 
and LS (.~7); in separate comparisons, performance 
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Table 2. Mean percentage of correct completions and 
facilitation scores as a function of orienting 
task and test item in Experiment 1. 
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Note: 
cc 
Facilitation 
PR 
Facilitation 
LS 
Facilitation 
Old 
.70 
.31 
.61 
Test Item 
Exemplar 
.48 
.13 
New 
.38 
.37 
Facilitation ("priming"} scores were computed for 
each subject by subtracting performance on New items 
from that on Old and Exemplar items. CC = Category-
classification; PR = Pleasantness rating; LS = 
Letter-scanning. 
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following PR (.50) did not differ statistically from the 
other two groups. The interaction between test-item and 
orienting task was marg~ally significant F(~,138)=2.30, 
MSe=.018, p < .01. Post-hoc comparisons (Newman-Keuls) 
revealed a number of reliable differences (alpha = .05). 
First, completion performance on Old items following the 
non-semantic task LS (.61) was less than that following both 
of the ·semantic tasks: PR (.70) and CC (.7~). Second, 
performance on Old items was greater than that on Exemplar 
items for all three study groups. Third, only the CC group 
completed Exemplar items at a level reliably greater than 
that with New items. Finally, performance on New items was 
not significantly different among the three study 
conditions. This null finding shows that baseline 
performance was statistically equivalent among the three 
groups and therefore justifies the analysis of facilitation 
scores presented next. 
Analysis of facilitation scores revealed a main effect 
of test-item, F(1,69)=102.02, MSe=.02, p < .0001. As 
expected, facilitation was larger for items actually 
presented at study (i.e., Old items, .32) than for items 
only semantically related to presented items (i.e., Exemplar 
items, .08). The main effect of orienting task was also 
significant, F(2,69)=3.7~, MSe=.0~8, p < .03. T-tests (LSD) 
showed facilitation following CC (.26) to be significantly 
greater than both PR (.18) and LS (.15), which did not 
~---~-~ ---
33 
differ from each other. The interaction between test-item 
and orienting task was not reliable (F=1.1~). Post-hoc 
comparisons (Newman-Keuls) were generally similar to the 
main effect results reported above: for Old items, CC (.~0) 
produced greater facilitation than both PR (.31) and LS 
(.2~), p's < .05; the difference between the latter two 
groups was not reliable. Similarly, facilitation in 
completing Exemplar items was most apparent following CC 
(.13); this level of performance exceeded that in both the 
PR (.0~), p < .10, and LS (.05), p < .06, conditions. 
Completion time. The mean times Cms) required to complete 
test fragments as a function of orienting task and test item 
are presented in Table 3. An ANOVA revealed only an effect 
of test item, FC2,138)=27.88, MSe=778331, p < .0001. T-
tests (LSD) showed all means to be reliably different: Old 
items (2350) were completed significantiy faster than 
Exemplar items (3100) which, in turn, were completed faster 
than New items (3~20). 
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Table 3. Mean completion times Cms) as a function of 
orienting task and test item in Experiment 1. 
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Note: 
Test Item 
Old Exemplar New 
cc 2287 3028 3161 
PR 2232 2956 34-96 
LS 2533 3311 3603 
CC = Category-classification; PR = Pleasantness 
rating; LS = Letter-scanning. 
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~ Recall 
Two analyses were performed on the free-recall results; 
one on the simple proportion recalled and a second on an 
adjusted score which corrected for recall intrusions. The 
use of categorized lists and incidental memory instructions 
at encoding was expected to result in a high percentage of 
guesses on the final recall test. Thus, similar to 
corrected recognition scores (i.e., hits minus false 
alarms), adjusted recall scores were calculated to provide a 
more accurate depiction of recall memory. 
An ANOVA of the simple proportions yielded a 
significant effect of study orientation, F(2,69)=62.0, 
MSe=.0205, p < .0001. As can be seen in Table ~. recall 
following LT was much lower than that following CC and PR; 
however, the difference between the latter two groups was 
not reliable. Because of the high level of recall 
intrusions (17% of the total number of items output), a 
second analysis was performed on on an adjusted recall score 
which subtracted intrusions from target items recalled. 
This analysis was also was significant, F(2,69)=~3.03, 
MSe=.028, P < .0001. T-tests showed all group means to be 
significantly different (see Table~). 
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Table l.tr. Mean percentage of items recalled and adjusted 
percentage of items recalled as a function of 
orienting task in Experiment 1. 
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Note:' 
Recall Measure 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
cc .62 .1,&.9 
PR .67 .61 
LS .25 .18 
Adjusted recall was computed for each subject by 
subtracting recall intrusions from target items 
recalled. CC ,= Category-classification; PR = 
Pleasantness rating; LS = Letter-scanning. 
Disscussion 
The results of Experiment 1 were generally 
with predictions. On fragment-completion, 
classification CCC) produced the highest 
performance followed by Pleasantness rating 
finally, the non-semantic Letter-scanning 
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consistent 
Category-
level of 
CPR) and, 
(LS) task. 
Assuming that the analysis of facilitation scores provides 
the most accurate depiction of the data, completion of Old 
items did not differ statistically for the PR and LS groups; 
both, however, facilitated performance less than CC. 
Performance on Exemplar items also followed this general 
trend; completion of non-studied category members exceeded 
baseline only in the CC group. It was not the case, 
however, that category-classification resulted in superior 
performance on all retention measures; on the direct measure 
of free recall, pleasantness ratings produced the most 
accurate performance. 
Fragment completion has been described as an implicit 
measure of memory because subjects are not instructed to 
"remember" items from the previous study experience, but 
only to complete test items with "the first word that comes 
to mind." 
performance 
In addition, a variety of studies 
on this measure to be equivalent 
have shown 
following 
semantic and non-semantic processing (Graf & Mandler, 
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Unlike previous studies, 
1984-; 
the 
present experiment used categorized words at both study and 
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test and found a clear advantage for semantically processed 
words. The strongest implication of the present set of data 
is that unconscious retrieval processes are highly sensitive 
to, and affected by, previous conceptual operations; the 
influence of these operations, however, is dependent upon 
reinstatement of the relevant study context. As discussed 
above, previous failures to demonstrate an effect of 
semantic processing on indirect measures of memory may 
largely reflect a lack of contextual overlap between study 
and test (Jacoby, 1983a; Toth & Hunt, 1990). 
Of course, the strong conclusion presented above would 
be suspect if subjects attempted to intentionally recall 
study items during the fragment completion test. A number 
of points, both methodological and empirical, argue against 
this interpretation. First, "study" processing was 
incidental with respect to memory and the fragment 
completion test was presented as one of a number of 
unrelated tasks. Subjects were instructed to complete all 
items with the first word that came to mind and could not go 
back to previously unsolved items. Other researchers (e.g., 
Graf & Mandler, 198~; Roediger, Srinivas, & Weldon, 1989; 
Schacter & Graf, 1986) have provided evidence that these 
indirect testing methods eliminate conscious retrieval 
strategies. In addition to these methods, the present 
experiment restricted the amount of time each test stimulus 
was present, further reducing the usefulness of conscious, 
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reconstructive strategies. Important here is the fact that, 
although subjects were allowed 10 seconds to complete any 
test item, the average completion time for Old items was 
just over 2 seconds. 
Additional evidence that retrieval in fragment-
completion was unintentional is provided by the dissociation 
between that measure and free recall. Completion 
performance following Category-classification was superior 
to that following Pleasantness rating and Letter-scanning. 
Yet on the direct measure of free recall, PR produced 
performance superior to that of CC (cf. Einstein & Hunt, 
1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981). If completion performance was 
based on intentional retrieval, the pleasantness rating 
group would have shown the highest level of completions. 
The present set of results therefore suggest that 
unconscious retrieval processes are indeed sensitive to 
previous conceptual operations. Given the theoretical 
analysis outlined in the introduction, these results should 
not be surprising. The form of processing engaged by 
category-classification would be most effective in a 
retrieval environment characterized by the presence of 
categorical information. All groups were presented at study 
with a perceptual stimulus pattern that was specific to a 
subsequent test item. However, unlike PR and LS, Category-
classification presumably engaged conceptual operations more 
specific to those required on the fragment test. 
~0 
In this regard, it can be speculated that PR acted 
s~ilar to other semantic orienting tasks used in studies of 
implicit memory - tasks which have not produced higher 
performance relative to non-semantic orientation (Graf & 
Mandler, 198~; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). Although a form of 
semantic processing, pleasantness. ratings require study 
items to be considered in relation to knowledge other than 
category membership. In the absence of test demands that 
re-engage this form of processing, no effect of semantic 
orientation would be expected. It would appear to be the 
categorically structured nature of the test list that 
allowed the effect to emerge in the CC group (cf Winnick & 
Daniel, 1970). 
Finding an effect of semantic processing on an indirect 
measure raises interesting theoretical questions, one of 
which concerns the issue of test awareness and its relation 
to intentionality (see Schacter et al., 1989). Although 
awareness of a prior episode is often taken to imply 
intentionality at retrieval, the two concepts are 
theoretically distinct. It is quite possible to be aware of 
the relationship between a current and past episode and yet 
not consciously attempt (i.e., intend) to retrieve 
information from that episode. Nevertheless, awareness of 
the past would appear to make intentional retrieval a more 
likely possibility. 
Although rarely assessed, it appears that a substantial 
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number of subjects in studies of 1mplicit memory become 
aware that previously presented items are re-presented at 
test (see, e.g., Bowers & Schacter, 1990; Richardson-Klahven 
& Bjork, 1988; Schacter, 1987). In the present experiment, 
informal interviews following the fragment completion test 
suggested that the majority of subjects were aware that some 
test items had been presented earlier. However, even when 
questioned directly, no subject reported attempting to 
recall study items. The most frequent comment was that the 
temporal constraints of the test and the degraded nature of 
the stimulus made recall an ineffective strategy. Most 
subjects reported that the solution word simply "popped into 
mind", after which they assessed whether or not it had been 
presented earlier. 
Nevertheless, the presence of test'awareness raises the 
possibility that retrieval was not entirely unintentional, 
but rather involved "involuntary explicit memory" (Schacter, 
1987). According to Schacter (1987; see also, Richardson-
Klavehn & Bjork, 1988), involuntary explicit memory occurs 
"when a test cue leads to an unintentional but fully 
conscious and explicit 'reminding' of the occurence of a 
prior episode" (p.510). In the present experiment, it seems 
unlikely that test cues per se (i.e., word-fragments) 
reminded subjects of the prior study experience. Test 
solutions, however, probably had this effect. Furthermore, 
the high rate of completion performance following category-
classification suggests that subjects in this condition were 
in a better position to become aware of the relationship 
between study and test. The question, of course, is whether 
knowledge of this relationship was used to initiate 
intentional retrieval. Although the dissociation between 
orienting task (CC vs. PR) and retention measure (fragment 
completion vs. free recall) is consistent with the claim 
that retrieval was unintentional, the dissociation was 
rather weak. Stronger conclusions could be drawn if even 
the possibility of consciously-controlled retrieval was 
eliminated. The second experiment was designed to achieve 
this goal. 
The 
CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
predominant method of 
i!-3 
assessing unconscious 
retrieval processes has involved the use of indirect 
retention measures such as fragment completion or perceptual 
identification. The assumption underlying this method is 
that task instructions or other procedural details (see 
above) are sufficient to preclude the use of intentional 
retrieval strategies. This assumption may be invalid for a 
number of reasons. As discussed above, it is very likely 
that subjects become aware of the nature of indirect 
measures once they have been presented with a number of 
study items. Awareness need not imply intentionality, but 
the conditions under which subjects intentionally retrieve 
information from past episodes are little understood. 
Indirect memory instructions provide no control over the 
processes actually engaged (note 3). 
A more important reason for questioning whether 
indirect retention measures provide the best index of 
unconscious retrieval is that no test of memory may be 
process pure. All retention measures may involve both 
conscious (intentional) and unconscious (unintentional) 
processes operating interactively. This assumption is 
consistent with the position that conscious strategies can 
enhance performance on indirect measures (see Richard-
Klavehn & Bjork, 1988, esp. pp. 527-528); and with the view 
that "implicit" retrieval may support performance on direct 
measures (Chiarello & Hoyer, 1988; Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 
198~; Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990; Shimamura, 1986). Such 
observations suggest that specific retrieval processes 
cannot be identified with individual retention measures. 
What is required is a method that separates intentional from 
unintentional retrieval within a single task. 
One 
involves 
strategy for separating the two forms 
manipulating the time available for 
of memory 
stimulus 
processing. This strategy relies on the distinction between 
automatic and controlled processing (LaBerge & Samuels, 
197~; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) and 
assumes that unintentional retrieval shares important 
characteristics with processes described as automatic. 
Compared with consciously-controlled processes, automatic 
processes are described as faster, requiring less effort, 
and occurring without intent or awareness. If unintentional 
retrieval is an automatic process, it may be possible to 
preclude the influence of conscious, reconstructive 
retrieval strategies by employing a retention measure that 
requires a fast response. 
One paradigm which meets this criterion is the response 
signal ("deadline") procedure. Following a study 
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experience, subjects are presented with individual test 
items followed by a signal to respond. By varying the delay 
between presentation of the test item and presentation of 
the response signal, the expertmenter can control the amount 
of time available for stimulus processing. 
Response signal procedures have been used previously to 
explore various aspects of memory. Developed by Reed (1973, 
1976), the procedure has been used to reveal the time course 
of retrieval. By using a variety of response signal delays 
(e.g., 100, 300, 600 rns, etc.), the procedure can provide 
data concerning the speed with which information becomes 
available and has been used to ·assess the effects of 
semantic priming on bias and discrimination of target items 
(Dosher, McElree, Hood, & Rosedale, 1989), the differential 
availability of item and associative information (Gronlund & 
Ratcliff, 1989), and the relationship between memory and 
inference following text processing (McKeon & Ratcliff, 
1989). 
Experiment 2 used the response signal procedure to 
assess the mnemonic effects of semantic and non-semantic 
processing at different times in the recognition process. 
Recognition was chosen for two reasons. First, it is easily 
integrated with the response signal procedure. More 
importantly, a variety of theoreticians have described 
recognition as involving a number of component processes, 
both conscious and unconscious in nature. Dual process 
theories (Gillund & Shiffrin, 198~; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; 
Mandler, 1980) propose that recognition decisions can be 
based on two independent sources of information, 
recollection and familiarity. Recollection is a 
consciously-controlled (intentional) "search" process that 
requires the recall or reconstruction of a relevant prior 
experience. Alternatively, familiarity can be viewed as an 
unintentional, automatic influence of memory. If 
recollection requires more time than the assessment of 
familiarity, then an early response signal during the 
recognition process may isolate familiarity-based 
responding. 
Roediger and colleagues (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987b; 
Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989; see also, Jacoby, 1983b) 
have suggested that recognition be understood as a mixture 
of data-driven and conceptually-driven processes. Part of 
the rationale for this suggestion is that, while 
operationally a direct ("explicit") measure of memory, 
recognition often responds similarly to manipulations which 
influence performance on indirect measures. Although the 
critical variables have not been identified, under some 
conditions recognition may show sensitivity to study-test 
changes in surface information such as modality (Hashtroudi, 
Ferguson, Rappold, & Chrosniak, 1988; Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981). Such sensitivity is a defining characteristic of 
data-driven processing a form of processing associated 
{,J,7 
with implicit memory (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). 
Although the response signal procedure can restrict the 
amount of time a stimulus is available, it is unclear at 
what point intentional retrieval would be precluded. 
However, by manipulating the modality in which information 
is presented, it may be possible to separate the data-driven 
component from the conceptually-driven component in 
recognition. Modality effects are typically found on 
indirect retention measures; a modality effect can therefore 
act as a "marker," indicating the point in time at which 
retrieval is predominantly unintentional. The question of 
interest is whether prior semantic processing will 
facilitate performance more than non-semantic processing at 
this point in the recognition process. 
To summarize, Experiment 2 manipulated orienting task 
and study-test modality in a response signal procedure to 
assess the effects of semantic input processing on 
unintentional retrieval. At input, subjects were presented 
with a list of words, half visual, half auditory. Input 
words were processed either semantically (pleasantness 
rating) or non-semantically (rhyme judgment). Recognition 
memory was assessed by presenting old and new items followed 
by a signal to respond; the signal occurred either 500 or 
1500 ms after the test item was presented. All test items 
were presented visually. 
Jacoby, Woloshyn, and Kelly (1989) have used 
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manipulations of attention to study unconscious influences 
of memory. In those studies, dividing attention reduced 
subjects' ability to consciously recollect a prior study 
experience, thus allowing effects on unintentional retrieval 
to emerge. The present experiment can be viewed as 
employing an analogous strategy. A short (500ms) delay was 
expected to prevent conscious, reconstructive retrieval 
processes; a long (1500ms) delay, to allow such processes to 
operate. Modality was manipulated to provide an independent 
index of unintentional retrieval. It was predicted that 
responding at the short delay would be marked by substantial 
modality effects which would be attenuated at the long 
delay. In line with the results of Experiment 1, an effect 
of semantic processing was expected to occur at both points 
in time. 
Method 
Design and subjects 
The experiment was designed as a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed-
factorial. Orienting task (pleasantness rating, rhyme 
judgment) and response signal delay (500ms, 1500ms) were 
manipulated between subjects. The relationship between test 
words and prior study experience was manipulated within 
subjects; all test words were presented visually and 
included words previously read (visual), heard (auditory), 
and words that had not been presented (new). Twenty-four 
subjects participated in return for credit in introductory 
t.9 
psychology courses. Subjects were tested individually. 
Materials ~ equipment 
A total of 96 nouns, from ~ to 7 letters in length and 
ranging in frequency from 1 to ~~2 occurrences per million 
(Kucera & Francis, 1967), were used as critical stimulus 
materials. Forty-eight of those words were separated into 
two sets· of 2t. for use at study. The remaining ~8 words 
were used as distractors on the recognition test. 
Distractor (new) words were not rotated with study words, as 
the main comparisons of interest involved the effect of 
study modality (visual vs. auditory) on recognition 
performance. Average frequencies (Kucera & Francis, 1967) 
of the two study sets and the distractor set were 72.3, 
72.3, and 70.5, respectively. In addition to the critical 
words, eight medium-frequency. (53-72 occurrences per 
million) words were used as primacy and recency buffers at 
study. The complete set of critical stimuli are provided 
in Appendix 2. 
Except for the auditory study list (see below), all 
stjmuli were presented on a monochrome CRT (Amdek video-
300). When reaction time was measured, subjects responded 
by pressing a key on a tone generator; this triggered a 
Coulbourn voice switch (model S28-2t.) connected to a Tecmar 
Labtender in an IBM-XT. 
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Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in three phases; study, 
response training, and test. In the study phase, subjects 
were informed that word-judgments were being coll~cted for 
normative purposes; thus, the study phase was incidental 
with respect to memory. Subjects were told that they would 
be presented with a list of words, half of which would be 
presented on the computer screen and half of which would be 
read by the experimenter. Subjects in the pleasantness 
rating condition were told that their task was to rate the 
pleasantness of each word using a five-point scale which was 
attached below the computer screen .(1 = unpleasant, 3 = 
neutral, 5 =pleasant). Subjects were told to think about 
the meaning of each word and to rate the pleasantness of 
that meaning on the response sheet provided. Subjects in 
the rhyme judgment condition were told that their task 
involved rating how difficult it is to produce rhymes for 
the presented words, using a five-point scale (1 = very 
easy, 5 =very difficult). Subjects were told that, to make 
their judgment, they could either come up with rhymes 
silently or make an intuitive judgment based on the sound of 
the word. Study lists were presented in an alternating 
fashion (visual, auditory, visual, auditory, etc.) using a 
different random order for each subject. Four primacy (2 
visual and 2 auditory) and four recency (2 visual and 2 
auditory) items were also presented. Visual words were 
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presented in the center of the CRT and remained on the 
screen for one second. Subjects were allowed as much time 
as they needed to make their rating; once. a response had 
been made, the next word was provided. 
The second phase of the experiment was designed to give 
subjects practice with the response signal procedure. 
Following McKoon & Ratcliff (1989), a lexical descision task 
was used because it requires no study experience and allows 
for quick training. The sequence of events for this task 
was as follows. A set of arrows indicating the future 
location of a test string appeared in the center of the CRT. 
One second later a test string (word or non-word) appeared 
between the arrows. After 500 or 1500 ms (depending on the 
delay condition), a row of 2~ asterisks appear 2 lines under 
the string. Subjects were instructed to respond within ~00 
ms after the asterisks appeared; "yes" responses (words) 
were made with the right hand, "no" responses (non-words) 
with the left hand. Immediately after a response was made 
the screen was cleared and the response time was displayed 
at the top of the screen. If the response time was faster 
than 50 ms the message "Too fast ... Wait for the stars" was 
displayed. If the response time was slower than 400 ms, the 
message "Too slow ... Try to respond faster" was displayed. 
If the response time was within this range (50-~00), the 
message "Good!!!" was displayed. 
Following the training phase, subjects were informed 
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that their memory for words presented in phase 1 would be 
tested. They were told that test words would be presented 
in the same format as letter strings in the preceeding task 
and that their responses should occur within ~00 ms after 
the asterisks appeared. They were told to respond "yes" if 
the word was presented in phase 1 and "no" if it was not. 
The testing procedure was identical to that used in phase 2 
with the exception of the test stimuli. The test list was 
random with the exception that visual, auditory, and new 
items were equally distributed throughout. 
Results 
Responses were included for analysis if they occurred 
within 50 to 500 ms after the response signal appeared. 
Timin~ errors due to subjects or equipment occurred on 189 
(8%) of the 230~ test trials. Data were analyzed in terms 
of both accuracy and response time (within the 50-500 ms 
range). 
Accuracy 
The percentage of items correctly recognized (hits 
correct rejections) as a function of orienting 
and 
task 
(pleasantness rating, rhyme judgment), response signal delay 
(500, 1500 ms), and study item (visual, auditory, new) are 
presented in Table 5. Table 5 also contains corrected 
recognition scores (hits - false alarms) for visual and 
auditory items. 
Table 
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5. Mean percentage of correct recognitions 
corrected recognition scores as a function 
orienting task, delay, and study item 
Experiment 2. 
and 
of 
in 
Orienting task 
Semantic Non-semantic 
Delay: 500 1500 500 1500 
Visual .86 .9,. .7,. .77 
Corrected .67 .8,. .51 .53 
Auditory .68 .90 .58 .77 
Corrected ·'*9 .80 .35 .53 
New .81 .91 .76 .75 
Semantic orientation was pleasantness rating. Non-
semantic orientation was rhyme judgment. Corrected 
recognition scores were calculated for each subject 
by subtracting false alarms from hits. 
5/,t. 
An overall analysis of correct recognitions (hits and 
correct rejections) revealed main effects of orienting task, 
F(1,20)=15.2, MSe=.O~,t.8, p < .002, delay, F(1,20)=11.0, 
MSe=.0~8. p < .OO~,t., and study item, F(2,~,t.O)=~,t..8, MSe=.012, p 
< .02. Superior performance was found for pleasantness 
rating as opposed to rhyme judgment ( .85 vs .. 73), and for 
the 1500 ms delay as opposed to the 500 ms delay (.8~ vs . 
. 7~). The main effect of study item was a function of the 
low hit rate for auditory study items ( .73) in comparison to 
visual study items (.83) and correct rejection of new words 
(. 81). The interaction between delay and study item was 
also significant, F(2,~0)=3.8, MSe=.012, p < .03. As with 
the main effect of study item, this interaction was almost 
entirely due to performance on auditory study items; 
recognition increased from .63 at the 500 ms delay to .8~ at 
the 1500 ms delay. Comparable increases across delay (500 
to 1500) were much smaller for both visual study items 
to .86) and new items ( .79 to .83). 
( . 80 
The most important aspects of the 
recognition of studied words (visual and 
data involved 
auditory) as a 
function of orienting task and delay. For 
separate analyses were performed on both 
recognition scores and the corrected scores 
these items, 
the unadjusted 
(hits - false 
alarms). Given that both analyses produced the same pattern 
of results, only the analysis on corrected scores is 
reported. Pleasantness ratings produced more accurate 
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performance than rhyme jugdments (.70 vs. .~8), 
F(1,20)=15.8, MSe=.038, p < .0007; performance following the 
1500 ms delay was better than that following the 500 ms 
delay (.67 vs. .50), F(1,20)=9.0, MSe=.038, p < .007; 
and visual study produced higher performance than auditory 
study ( .6~ vs .. 5~), F(1,20)=22.2, MSe=.OO~B, p < .0001. 
More important, the interaction between delay and study 
modality was highly reliable, F(1,20)=13.8, MSe=.OO~B, p < 
.002. Whereas visual study items were more accurately 
recognized than auditory study items at the 500 ms delay 
(.59 vs .. ~2), this difference was nearly eliminated at the 
1500 ms delay (.68 vs .. 66). This interaction strongly 
suggests that different psychological processes mediated 
performance at the two delays. 
The three-way interaction was not reliable (F=.ll), 
indicating 
both the 
that an effect of orienting task was present at 
500 and 1500 ms delays. Post-hoc comparisons 
(Newman-Keuls) showed that, within modality, orienting task 
had a significant influence on performance at the 500 ms 
delay (p < .01, for both the visual and auditory items). A 
final set of comparisons showed that performance on visual 
items following non-semantic orientation did not increase 
across delay (.51 vs .. 53); semantic orientation, however, 
resulted in a significant increase in performance for visual 
items (.67 vs .. 8~). 
---- ------~·····------------
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Response ~ 
Only response times occurring within the 50-500 ms 
range were accepted for analysis. Table 6 presents mean 
response times, conditionalized on correct recognition (hits 
and correct rejections), for each of the experimental 
conditions. In an analysis these data, only the effect of 
orienting task approached significance, F(1,20)=2.99, 
MSe=1025~.9, p < .10; responses following semantic 
orientation (2~6 ms) were slightly faster than those 
following non-semantic orientation (270 ms). Post-hoc 
comparisons (Newrnan-Keuls) showed that responses to visual 
study items at the 1500 ms delay were faster following 
semantic {227) than non-semantic orientation (277), p < .01; 
however, although in the .same direction, a similar 
comparison for auditory study items was not reliable. 
One other aspect of the response time data may be worth 
emphasizing. As noted by Gronlund and Ratcliff (1989), 
response signal experiments typically show decreasing 
latencies as a function of delay. As can be seen in Table 
6, this pattern occurred following semantic orientation but 
not following non-semantic orientation. Reed (1976) has 
suggested that latency be viewed as reflecting relative 
preparedness to respond and that differences between 
conditions might indicate different processing demands. 
Although not overwhelming, the pattern of response time data 
suggests that the processing demands at test were not 
equivalent following semantic and non-semantic study. 
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Table 6. Mean response time, conditionalized on correct 
recognition, as a function of orienting task, 
delay, and test item in Experiment 2. 
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Note: 
Orienting task 
Semantic Non-semantic 
Delay: 500 1500 500 
Visual 
Auditory 
New 
Semantic 
semantic 
response 
following 
255 227 264-
267 277 
245 237 262 
orientation was pleasantness rating. 
orientation was rhyme judgment. 
times occurring within 50 to 
response signal were included. 
1500 
277 
270 
268 
Non-
Only 
500 ms 
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Discussion 
Experiment 2 manipulated the time available for word 
recognition in an attempt to separate intentional from 
unintentional retrieval processes. Using a response signal 
procedure, it was hypothesized that short target-signal 
delays would prevent the use of conscious, reconstructive 
retrieval strategies whereas long delays would allow such 
strategies to operate. The results of the experiment 
strongly suggest that the manipulation was successful. 
Study modality was manipulated in order to provide a 
marker for the operation of unintentional retrieval 
processes. For both orienting tasks a large modality effect 
was found at the 500 ms delay, but the effect was virtually 
eliminated at the 1500 ms delay. Th'is interaction indicates 
that different psychological processes mediated performance 
at the two delays. Although modality effects are sometimes 
obtained in recognition memory (Hastroudi et al., 1988; 
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), like free recall, recognition 
performance is usually equivalent following visual and 
auditory study (Kirner, Milech, & Standen, 1983; Roediger & 
Blaxton, 1987a). Indirect measures, on the other hand, 
invariably show modality effects (Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 
1985; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Kirsner et al., 1983; Kirsner & 
Smith, 1974; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987b). Indeed, 
sensitivity to study-test changes in surface information has 
been taken as a criteria! difference between implicit and 
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explicit memory (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987b; Schacter, 1987). 
Thus, the interaction between modality and delay is 
consistent with the assumption that intentional retrieval 
processes were considerably attenuated at the short delay. 
Nevertheless, a large effect of orienting task was 
found at both points in the retrieval episode. Semantic 
study produced better performance than non-semantic study 
irrespective of total processing time at recognition. An 
effect of orienting task was expected at the long delay 
(Craik & Tulving, 1975) and suggests that performance in 
this condition was a function of intentional retrieval 
processes. Similar 
response recognition 
effects have been found 
paradigms (see Gillund 
using fast-
& Shiffrin, 
198~); however, the current experiment demonstrates 
this effect can be obtained simultaneously with a 
effect of modality, and therefore represents a novel 
challenging finding. Consistent with the results 
Experiment 1, this pattern of data suggests 
unintentional retrieval processes can be 
that 
large 
and 
from 
that 
by influenced 
previous conceptual operations. 
Dual-process models of recognition (Gillund & Shiffrin, 
198~; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980) propose that 
recognition decisions can be based on either familiarity or 
recollection. In these models, familiarity is treated as a 
more automatic basis for responding than is 
Familiarity-based responding is generally 
recollection. 
faster than 
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recollective-based responding and does not require the 
intentional retrieval of contextual details associated with 
a study experience. The pattern of results obtained in the 
present experiment is in accord with this theoretical 
decription. However, the assumption that stimulus 
familiarity is a function of the perceptual similarity 
between initial experience and subsequent exposure (Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980) was not supported. The present 
results suggest that familiarity-based responding is not a 
function of perceptual similarity alone; the conceptual 
operations performed at study also appear to influence this 
aspect of the recognition process. 
A related point can be made concerning Roediger's 
approach to recognition (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987b; 
Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989). Based on parallels and 
dissociations between recognition and indirect measures of 
memory, Roediger has suggested that recognition be 
understood as a composite of data-driven and conceptually-
driven components. Presumably, the data-driven component of 
recognition accounts for the effect of surface-level 
manipulations, whereas the conceptually-driven component 
accounts for semantic effects. Although at some level this 
characterization appears correct, the present set of results 
questions whether the two components can be separated 
experimentally. Requiring a fast recognition decision 
produced a large modality effect, thus indicating the 
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presence of data-driven processing. But conceptually-driven 
processes were equally apparent and at a very early stage in 
retrieval. At the very least, these results suggests that 
data-driven and conceptually-driven processing are highly 
interactive (see Hunt & Toth, 1990; Toth & Hunt, 1990). 
As discussed above, the effect of target-signal delay 
can be viewed as influencing a subject's basis for 
responding; at the short delay, responding was presumably 
automatic and unintentional - based on a word's familiarity; 
at the long delay, responding was a function of consciously-
controlled processes. Certain aspects of the data, however, 
suggest that it may be inappropriate to associate processing 
times with particular bases for responding. The amount or 
type of input processing may also influence what information 
or processes are relied upon and this influence may 
sometimes be independent of response time. 
For both orienting tasks, performance on auditory study 
items improved with increases in target-signal delay. This 
can be interpreted as reflecting the use of conscious 
retrieval strategies; given suffir.ient processing time, 
recognition is based on a study words' referent, not its 
perceptual 
revealed 
semantic 
pattern. Visual 
a different pattern 
items, on the 
of performance. 
processing, performance on visual 
other hand, 
Following 
study items 
increased across the delay conditions; however, virtually no 
increase was observed for non-semantically processed items. 
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Taken together, these results suggest that, following 
semantic study and given sufficient processing time, 
subjects cun improve their performance by consciously 
recollecting a word's prior presentation. However, if the 
item to be remembered is not elaboratively processed (as is 
the case with non-semantic study), subjects may rely 
predominantly on familiarity-based responding, regardless of 
the processing time available. 
Although not conclusive, the response time data are 
consistent with this interpretation. Following semantic 
orientation, responding was faster at the 1500, as compared 
to the 500 ms, delay. This suggests a difference in 
readiness to respond (Reed, 1976) and implies that the 
increased delay allowed additional (analytic/contextually 
detailed) information to become available. No similar 
pattern was observed following non-semantic orientation, 
suggesting that readiness to respond was the same at both 
delays. This would be expected if responding was based only 
on familiarity. 
Of course, the interpretations offered above would 
require modification if responding at the short delay was 
based on intentional, conscious recollection. 
recognition is typically viewed as a direct, 
Because 
explicit 
measure of memory, it could be argued that the response 
signal procedure simply alters the way intentional retrieval 
processes are expressed. According to this argument, the 
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effect of orienting task at both delays would be attributed 
effect of 
increase the 
to intentional retrieval processes. The 
restricting 
1.·elative 
response time would simply be to 
contribution of perceptual (or data-driven) 
processes or representations. Experiment 3 was designed to 
provide further evidence that performance at the short delay 
was a function of automatic (and thus, unintentional) 
retrieval processes. 
- ------· ----
CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT 3 
64. 
Experiment 2 used a response signal procedure in an 
attempt to separate intentional from unintentional retrieval 
processes. The interaction between delay and modality 
suggests that the procedure was successful. However, it is 
possible that some level of conscious control was operating 
at the short delay. Recently, Jacoby (e.g., Jacoby et al., 
1989; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) has developed a method by 
which unconscious influences of memory can be unambiguously 
identified. This "exclusion" methodology, described below, 
offers a converging operation on the response signal 
procedure and can be used to provide conclusive evidence 
that unintentional retrieval is sensitive to previous 
conceptual operations. 
One of the difficulties in making conclusions about the 
effects of unconscious processes is that conscious processes 
can usually produce similar effects. For example, thinking 
about a word in one situation may increase the probability 
that the word automatically comes to mind in a similar 
situation. If there was no intent to remember the original 
episode, this would be an unconscious influence of memory. 
However, the word could also be brought to mind by 
consciously 
psychological 
the two cases; 
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recollecting the original episode. The 
processes involved may be very different in 
however, the effect (retrieving the word) is 
the same. Thus, without conclusive evidence that one set of 
processes were prevented from occurring, it can always be 
argued that so-called unconscious influences were actually 
produced by consciously-controlled processing that went 
undetected by the experimenter. Such is the case with the 
experiments reported above. Performance was influenced by 
previous meaningful processing; however, because effects of 
this sort have been shown to occur (in fact, have occurred 
most often) in the presence of conscious, intentional 
retrieval strategies, it can be argued that such strategies 
were present but undetected. (Of course, this explanation 
does not account for the dissociation obtained in Experiment 
1, nor the modality effects found in Experiment 2). 
One way around this interpretive problem is to set 
unconscious influences in opposition to conscious ones 
(e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989). If unconscious processes 
can be made to produce an effect opposite to that which 
would occur if processing was consciously-controlled, 
unconscious influences can be 
strategy used by Jacoby et al. 
of unintentional retrieval on 
isolated. This was the 
(1989) to study the effects 
subjective judgments. In 
those experiments, subjects were asked to make fame 
judgments to a list of names, some of which were non-famous 
--- ----- --- --
names 
were 
they 
told 
had read earlier in the experiment. 
that all of the names read earlier 
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Subjects 
were non-
famous. Nevertheless, in comparison to a set of new names, 
more of the old names were judged as famous. This can be 
clearly interpreted as an unconscious influence of memory 
because if subjects could consciously recollect a names 
prior occurrence, they could be sure it was not famous. 
Thus, assumming that one of the functions of consciousness 
ia to resist the influence of the past, placing conscious 
and unconscious processes in opposition can be useful for 
assessing their separate contributions to performance. 
Experiment 2 provided evidence that u'nintentional 
retrieval is differentially affected following semantic and 
non-semantic study. This conclusion was predicated on the 
assumption that forcing subjects to respond very quickly to 
test words prevented the use of intentional retrieval 
strategies,. However, it is possible that subjects 
consciously recollected the words' prior occurrence, thus 
producing the effect of orienting task. In order to 
distinguish between these interpretations, Experiment 3 
employed the "opposition logic" described above. 
In the first phase of the experiment, different groups 
of subjects processed a visually presented list of words 
either semantically or non-semantically. In this phase, no 
mention was made of the subsequent memory test. Next they 
were presented with a list of words aurally and told to 
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remember them for a test of recognition memory. The test 
list contained the visually and aurally presented words and 
a set of new words not previously presented. Prior to the 
test, subjects were told that words from the first phase 
(and new words) would be included on the test list; however, 
they were instructed to respond positively (i.e. , say "yes") 
only to those words they were told to remember (those 
presented aurally). 
As in Experiment 2, the test list was presented using 
the response signal procedure; half of the subjects were 
given a signal to respond 500 ms after the test word 
appeared, while the other half were given a response signal 
following a delay of 1500 ms. If responding at the 500 ms 
delay is based on conscious recollection then subjects 
should be able to respond negatively to words presented in 
the.first phase of the experiment; false alarm rates for old 
visual words should be no greater than that found for new 
words. Alternatively, if responding at the short delay is 
based on familiarity, and familiarity is an automatic, 
unintentional form of retrieval, then the false alarm rate 
for old visual items should be higher than that for new 
items. Furthermore, if semantic study produces a higher 
false alarm rate than non-semantic study, a strong case can 
be made that unintentional retrieval is influenced by how 
meaningfully an item was originally processed. 
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Method 
Design and subjects 
The experiment was designed as a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed-
factorial. Orienting task (pleasantness rating, letter 
judgment) and response signal delay (500ms, 1500ms) were 
manipulated 
auditory, no 
Visual items 
between subjects, whereas study item (visual, 
study (new)) was manipulated within subjects. 
were presented in the first phase of the 
experiment under incidental memory instructions and were 
processed either semantically (pleasantness rating) or non-
semantically (letter judgment). The letter judgment task 
was used instead of the rhyme judgment task (Experiment 2) 
to reduce the possibility of interference with the aurally 
presented words in Phase 2. The auditory words were 
presented under intentional memory instructions. For any 
individual subject, new words were first encountered at the 
time of test. All test words were presented visually. 
Thirty-two subjects participated in return for credit in 
introductory psychology courses. Subjects were tested 
individually. 
Materials and equipment 
A total of 120 nouns, from ~ to 8 letters in length and 
ranging in frequency from 1 to ~~2 occurrences per million 
(Kucera & Francis, 1967), were used as critical stimulus 
materials. Sixty of those words were separated into two 
sets of 30 for use at study (visual) and as new words on the 
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test of recognition. These two sets were rotated through 
conditions such that each set was used an equal number· of 
times as Phase 1 study words and as new test words. Average 
frequncies of the two sets were 93.2 and 93.5. The 
remaining 60 words were used as the aurally presented list 
in Phase 2. Average frequency for these 60 words was ~3.6. 
Words from the aurally presented list were not rotated with 
study words, as the main interest was in false alarm rates 
as a function of orienting task (semantic vs. non-semantic) 
in comparison to words not previously presented (i.e., new 
words). In addition to the critical words, eight medium-
frequency (53-72 occurrences per million) words were used as 
primacy and recency buffers in Phase 1. The complete set of 
critical stimuli are provided in Appendix 3. 
Except for the auditory study list (see below), all 
stimuli were presented on a monochrome CRT (Amdek video-
300). When reaction time was measured, subjects responded 
by pressing a key on a tone generator; this triggered a 
Coulbourn voice switch (model 528-2~) connected to a Tecmar 
Labtender in an IBM-XT. 
Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in four phases; incidental 
study, intentional study, response training, and test. The 
incidental study phase was identical to that in ExperimP.nt 2 
with the exception of the letter judgment task. For this 
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condition, the concept of bi-gram frequency was 
were told that their task involved 
explained 
scanning 
adjacent 
and subjects 
each word in order to identify which pair of 
believed appeared most infrequently letters 
English 
visually, 
they in the 
language. All words in Phase 1 were presented 
in the center of the CRT, and remained on the 
screen for one second. Subjects were allowed as much time 
as they needed to make their rating; once a response had 
been made, the next word was provided. 
ordered list was used for each subject. 
A different randomly 
In addition, four 
primacy and four recency items were also presented. 
In the second phase of the experiment the auditory word 
list was 
subjects 
the end 
presented under intentional memory instructions; 
were told to expect a recognition memory test at 
of the experiment. The list was read by the 
experimenter at a rate of approximately one word every three 
seconds. Subjects repeated each word aloud. 
Phase 3 (training) was described as an intervening task 
between study and test and was procedurally identical to the 
training phase in Experiment 2. Following the training 
phase, subjects were informed that their memory would be 
tested for the aurally presented words. They were told that 
the test list contained words from the first phase and words 
not presented in any part of the experiment, but they were 
to respond positively ("yes") only to words presented l.n 
Phase 2; all other words should be rejected ("no"). In 
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addition, subjects were told that the test words would be 
presented in the same format as letter strings in the 
preceeding task and that their responses should occur within 
~00 ms after the asterisks appeared. The testing procedure 
was identical to that used in phase 2 with the exception of 
the test stimuli. The test list was random with the 
exception that visual, auditory, and new items were equally 
distributed throughout. 
Results and Discussion 
Responses were included for analysis if they occurred 
within 50 to 500 ms after the response signal appeared. 
Timing errors due to subjects or equipment occurred on 258 
(7%) of the 38~0 test trials. Data were analyzed in terms 
of both accuracy and response time (within the 50-500 ms 
range). 
Analysis of the response time data, conditionalized on 
correct recognition decisions 
words, "no" for visual and 
(i.e.' "yes" 
new words), 
for auditory 
revealed that 
responses were faster at the long, as opposed to short delay 
(231 vs. 262 ms), F(1,28)=9.27, MSe=7596.1, p < .006. As 
noted above, response signal experiments typically show a 
decrease in response latency as a function of delay. The 
only other 
F(2,56)=3.56, 
reliable effect was 
MSe=585.5, p < .0~. 
that of study 
Unstudied (new) 
item, 
words 
(238 ms) were responded to faster than Phase 2 (auditory) 
words (249) which, in turn, were responded to faster than 
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Phase 1 (visual) words (25~). 
In line with the hypotheses under investigation, 
accuracy data were scored in terms of the probability of 
calling a word "old"; this amounts to correct recognition of 
aurally presented words and false alarms for visual and new 
items. These probabilities are presented in Table 7 as a 
function of orienting task, delay, and study item. Three 
analyses were performed on different aspects of these data, 
each of which is described below. 
The assumption that response delay affected retrieval 
mode can be assessed by comparing false alarm rates for 
those items which subjects were instructed to reject: visual 
words from Phase 1 and new words. An analysis of these 
items showed that false alarm rates were much higher at the 
short, as opposed to long, delay ( .3~ vs. .18), 
F(1,28)=19.8, MSe=.O~~. p < .000~, and higher for old (Phase 
1) words in comparison to new words ( .32 vs. 20), 
F(1,28)=.17.0, MSe=.027, p < .0006. The interaction between 
these two factors was also reliable, F(1,28)=~-~3, MSe=.027, 
p < .05; the difference between old and new words was 
greater at the short delay (.~3 vs .. 25) than at the long 
delay ( . 20 vs. . 15) . These results show that restricting 
response time decreased subjects' ability to consciously 
recollect (and thus reject) old items, whereas the longer 
reponse time allowed such recollection to occur. 
Table 7. 
s 
t 
u 
d 
y 
I 
t 
e 
m 
Note: 
Mean percentage of "old" responses as a 
of orienting task, delay, and study 
Experiment 3. 
Orienting task 
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function 
item in 
Semantic Non-semantic 
Delay: 500 1500 500 1500 
Visual .56 .20 .30 .21 
New .27 .18 .22 .11 
Auditory .62 .55 .63 .76 
Semantic orientation was a pleasantness rating task. 
Non-semantic orientation was letter judgment task. 
Visual items were presented in Phase 1 under 
incidental study instructions. Auditory items were 
presented in Phase 2 under intentional study 
instructions. Values represent correct recognitions 
for auditory items and false alarm rates for visual 
and new items. 
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A second analysis included only data from items 
presented in Phase 1: visually presented words processed 
either semantically or non-semantically. This analysis 
showed that false alarm rates were higher following the 500 
ms, as opposed to 1500 ms, delay (.4,3 vs. .20), 
F(1,28)=26.13, MSe=.016, p < .0001. As with the first 
analysis, the higher false alarm rate at the short delay is 
consistent with the assumption that restricting retrieval 
time interferes with conscious recollection, leaving 
familiarity-based responding relatively unopposed. The main 
effect of orienting task was also significant, F(1,28)=8.79, 
MSe=.016, p < .007; pleasantness ratings resulted in a 
higher false alarm rate than letter judgments (.38 vs .. 25). 
More important, the interaction between delay·and orienting 
task was reliable. F(1,28)=9.30, MSe=.016, p < .006. The 
interaction shows that false alarm rates at the short delay 
were much higher following semantic (.56) than non-semantic 
processing ( .30); at the long delay, however, false alarm 
rates did not differ ( .20 vs .. 21). 
A final analysis of the percentage of words called 
"old" was 
corresponds 
words, and 
performed on the entire data set; this measure 
to false alarms for visual (Phase 1) and new 
correct recognitions for auditory (Phase 2) 
analysis revealed a main effect of delay, words. The 
F(1,28)=12.8, 
F(2,56)=106.5, 
MSe=.054,, 
MSe=.016, p 
p < .002, 
< • 0001. 
and study item, 
The main effect of 
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delay reflects the larger percentage of "old" responses at 
the short delay (.~3 vs .. 3~) and, in line with the 
assumptions concerning retrieval mode, suggests that 
responding became more conservative at the longer delay (see 
below). The main effect of study item shows that, as 
expected, auditory words elicited many more "old" responses 
than either visual or new words (.6~, .32, and .20, 
respectively). The interaction between delay and study item 
was also reliable, F(2,56)=8.22, MSe=.016, p < .002. This 
interaction can be understood as reflecting an increase in 
recollective-based responding and was mainly a function of 
the large decrease in "old" responses for visual words 
across response signal delay (from .~3 at 500ms to .20 at 
1500ms). Although not as great, new items also showed a 
decrease in the number of "old" responses (from .25 to .15); 
however, correct "old" responses for aurally presented words 
changed little from the short (.63) to the long delay (.65). 
Orienting task interacted with both delay, 
F(1,28)=7.24, 
F(2,56)=8.31, 
MSe=.054, 
MSe=.016, 
p < 
p < .002. 
. 02' and study item, 
The interaction between 
orienting task and delay shows that, at the short delay, 
more "old" responses were made following semantic than non-
semantic processing ( .48 vs. 
at the long delay (.31 vs. 
.31) but the reverse was found 
• 3 6) . The interaction between 
orienting task and study item occurred primarily because of 
the low level of correct responses to auditory words 
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following semantic (.58) as opposed to non-semantic input 
processing (.70). 
Both of these interactions can be understood by 
assuming that (a) intentional retrieval is substantially 
prevented at the short delay, and (b) as suggested in the 
discussion of Experiment 2, responding following non-
semantic study is based predominantly on familiarity, 
regardless of retrieval time. If given enough time, 
subjects in the pleasantness rating condition could 
consciously recollect a word's prior presentation; however, 
non-semantic processing results in a much lower level of 
recollection (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975). Because of this 
difference in conscious recollection, subjects in the 
semantic study condition may have been more sensitive to the 
possibility of falsely recognizing a visually presented 
item. This- would result in relatively conservative 
responding at the long delay, but only following semantic 
input processing. 
The above interpretation is supported by a comparison 
recognition performance on auditory items following semantic 
and non-semantic study at the two delays (see Table 7). 
Although the three-way interaction was only marginally 
significant, F(2,56)=3.03, MSe=.016, p < .06, post-hoc tests 
(Newman-Keuls) showed that correct recognition of auditory 
items at the short delay did not differ as a function of 
orienting task whereas at the long delay non-semantic 
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processing resulted in significantly more hits than semantic 
processing (.76 vs. .55), p < .05. It would appear that, 
for auditory items, responding at the short delay was based 
on similar retrieval processes following both study 
orientations. However, at the long delay, semantic input 
processing resulted in a stricter criterion for accepting an 
auditory item as old; that is, responding was more 
conservative. Assuming that subjects in the non-semantic 
condition could recollect little about the original (Phase 
1) study episode, a conservative response criteria would not 
be expected. In line with the results and analysis of 
Experiment 2, 'this interpretation would be consistent with 
the suggestion that non-semantic processing is predominantly 
based on familiarity, regardless of the amount of time 
available for retrieval. 
A difference in retrieval processes following semantic 
and non-semantic processing may also help explain why false 
alarm rates for Phase 1 words were equivalent at the long 
delay. This result was a bit surprising; based on previous 
research (Craik & Tulving, 1975) and the results of 
Experiment it was expected that the high level of 
recollection following semantic processing would allow Phase 
1 words to be more successfully rejected than following non-
semantic processing. The lack of a difference in these 
conditions suggests an asymmetry between the use of memory 
to select for items (as in Experiment 2) and the use of 
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memory to select against items. However, such an asymmetry 
may be understandable in the context of a dual-process 
theory of recognition (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 
1980), especially with the added notion that familiarity can 
be a function of prior conceptual operations. Although 
recollection was superior following semantic, as opposed to 
non-semantic, input processing, this condition also produced 
larger gains in familiarity. That is, for the semantic 
group, high levels of recollection were required to override 
the increased familiarity associated with prior 
presentation. For the non-semantic group, both recollection 
and familiarity were relatively impoverished. The net 
result of these opposing processes produced equivalent false 
alarm rates. 
To summarize the main results, in comparison to new 
words, restricting response times resulted in a higher rate 
of false recognitions for words previously presented (old 
words). Moreover, false recognitions at the short delay 
were much higher following semantic, as opposed to non-
semantic, study. These result substantiate the claim that 
unintentional retrieval is sensitive to prior meaningful 
processing. Requiring fast responses prevented conscious 
recollection; recognition decisions had to be made more 
automatically, based on an words' relative familiarity. 
Familiarity-based reponding, however, was not simply a 
function of perceptual similarity but also reflected prior 
conceptual operations performed at input. 
CHAPTER V 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
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The major goal of the experiments reported here was to 
demonstrate that unconscious retrieval processes can be 
influenced by conceptual/semantic encoding operations. This 
goal was largely achieved. In Experiment 1, an effect of 
encoding operations was obtained using fragment completion, 
an indirect retention measure which has been used 
extensively to study implicit memory. An effect of encoding 
operations was also found in Experiments 2 and 3, both of 
which employed a response signal procedure to separate 
from unconscious retrieval processes in conscious 
recognition. These results represent novel findings and are 
particularly relevant to three issues in contemporary memory 
theory: (1) the distinction between implicit and explicit 
memory, (2) the nature of unconscious retrieval processes, 
and (3) automatic processes in recognition memory. Each of 
these issues, and the relevance of the present experiments 
to current theoretical approaches, is addressed below. 
The Distinction between Implicit and Explicit Memory 
As noted earlier, the terms "implicit" and "explicit" 
have been used to refer to both retention measures and 
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hypothetical forms of memory. The potential negative 
consequences of confusing these two uses has led some 
researchers to propose the operationally defined terms 
"direct" and "indirect" to identify retention measures 
(Johnson & Hasher, 1987; Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). 
The point of this section is to argue that the theoretical 
distinction between 
inappropriate, most 
implicit 
notably 
and explicit 
because it 
memory is 
confounds 
intentionality with awareness. Instead, a more apt 
distinction is that between automatic and consciously-
controlled retrieval. As can be seen in the brief 
historical survey provided below, the terms implicit and 
explicit have served a useful function in identifying two 
general forms in which performance can be influenced by 
prior experience. However, the hypothetical forms of memory 
which these terms are meant to identify, and the related 
methodological approach of task dissociations, are not well 
suited to further explicate the variety of ways in which 
memory functions. 
The theoretical rationale for a distinction such as 
that between implicit and explicit memory is predicated on 
the assumption that the factors governing retrieval are 
different in the two cases. There is no doubt that some 
experimental manipulations differentially affect performance 
following direct and indirect instructions. However, the 
relationship between direct and indirect measures is not as 
----------------------------
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straightforward as the dissociations might suggest. 
Parallel effects among direct and indirect measures (Graf & 
Mandler, 198~; Hunt & Toth, 1990; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; 
Schacter & Graf, 1986a), dissociations between indirect 
measures (Hunt & Toth, 1990; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 
1989; Witherspoon & Moscovitch, 1989), and the influence of 
conceptual operations on indirect measures (Experiment 1 of 
the present work; Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner, Dawson, & 
Sutton, 1989; Hirshman et al., 1990; Toth & Hunt, 1990) have 
also been found. In addition, conceptual representations 
have been implicated in mediating re-reading times (an 
indirect measure of memory) for transformed text (Graf & 
Levy, 198~; Masson & Sala, 1978; Tardif & Craik, 1989). 
This complex pattern of findings highlights the need for a 
closer examination of the distinction between implicit and 
explicit memory. 
The theoretical separation of implicit and explicit 
memory relies on two related assumptions. First, that 
unconscious influences of memory occur only in the absence 
of awareness and intention. Second, that retention measures 
can be identified with specific retrieval processes: that 
is, indirect tests measure unconscious, unintentional 
processes whereas 
intentional processes. 
questionable (note~). 
direct tests measure conscious, 
Both of these assumptions are 
The contemporary interest in unconscious retrieval 
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processes can be traced to the discovery that amnesic 
subjects often show memory performance equivalent to that of 
normals when an indirect retention measure is used (for 
reviews, see Schacter, 
research showed that, 
dissociations can be 
1987; Shimamura, 1986). Subsequent 
within normal populations, similar 
found between direct and indirect 
measures as a function of certain experimental 
manipulations; for example, 
(Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) 
(Graf & Mandler, 198~). 
study-test changes in modality 
and elaborateness-of-processing 
These origin3l demonstrations 
touched off a wave of experiments intended to explicate 
differences between direct and indirect measures as a 
function of encoding variables (e.g., self-generation, 
repetition, intentional vs. incidental study, imagery, delay 
between study and test, test order, study-test changes in 
surface form, etc.). 
Presumably, the ultimate goal of these experiments was 
to understand the nature of unconscious processes in 
retrieval. This is an important goal. However, 
dissociations notwithstanding, there is no a priori reason 
to believe that indirect measures engage the same processes 
in normals and amnesics. Theoretically, correct performance 
on indirect measures does not require awareness of, or 
intent to retrieve, a prior episode. But there is little 
doubt that performance on these measures can be improved 
through the use of conscious, intentional retrieval 
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strategies. With amnesic subjects, there is reason to 
assume that such strategies are not, in fact cannot be, 
engaged (e.g., Johnson, 1990). This is not the case with 
normal populations. Current work on implicit memory is 
conducted almost entirely with a set of retention measures 
that do not control for the possibility of "contamination" 
from consciously-controlled (i.e., intentional) processes 
(note 5). However, the problem facing memory researchers is 
not simply one of correspondence between instructions 
(direct/indirect) and retrieval mode (explicit/implicit); 
rather, the notion that implicit and explicit memory are 
mutually exclusive categories may itself be suspect. 
Although often occurring together, awareness need not 
imply intentionality. Unconscious influences of memory can 
occur even though an individual is aware of the effects of 
prior experience. Recent work by Jacoby and colleagues has 
shown that the subjective experience of a reduction in 
background noise when hearing previously presented sentences 
(Jacoby, Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988) occurs even when 
subjects are aware of the effect and told to avoid it. 
Similarly, Experiment 3 of the present work demonstrated 
that even in the face of direct instructions to disregard a 
particular class of events (i.e., the visual list), 
unintentional retrieval processes may still control 
responding. This finding is similar to the effects found in 
Stroop tests, in which color words interfere with naming the 
8~ 
color of the words even though subjects are aware of the 
nature of the interference and do not intend to process the 
words semantically (note 6). Thus, in contrast to the 
assumption underlying the implicit/ explicit distinction, 
awareness and intention need not be perfectly correlated, 
nor does their presence rule out the possibility of 
unconscious influences. 
Nevertheless, the popular search for task dissociations 
attests to the prevalence of the assumption that retention 
~ests are process-pure (i.e., that tests can be identified 
with specific forms of memory). Task dissociations can only 
delineate differences in the nature of psychological 
processes if this assumption holds. However, if tasks 
engage a number of component processes as the studies cited 
above would suggest, a dissociation can only indicate that 
the tasks do not share some subset of those processes. 
Thus, the search for tnsk dissociations can tell us 
something about tasks, but very little about psychological 
processes. 
As noted earlier, a number of researchers have argued 
that conscious strategies can improve performance on 
indirect measure (see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988). 
Note that this argument does not necessarily imply that 
subjects intentionally retrieve information from a prior 
episode; rather, various forms of task-specific, 
consciously-controlled processing, could improve 
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performance. Experiment 1 found that an encoding task which 
drew attention to the categorical nature of the stimuli 
(category-classification) produced higher fragment 
completion performance than one which emphasized individual 
items (pleasantness-rating). Performance was reversed on 
free recall, suggesting that subjects did not attempt to 
intentionally retrieve study words on the fragment 
completion test. Nevertheless, given the categorically 
structured nature of the fragment test, it seems highly 
likely that performance was improved through consciously-
controlled strategies. It has also been proposed that 
unconscious retrieval processes support performance on 
direct tests (e.g., Jacoby & Hollingshead, 1990; Johnston, 
Dark, & Jacoby, 1985)·. This position is consistent with the 
results of Experiments 2 and 3. Recognition, a direct, 
"explicit" measure of memory, was shown to have a 
substantial automatic component that can be characterized as 
both unconscious and unintentional. 
Taken together, these ob~ervations suggest that the 
assumptions and methodology underlying the implicit/explicit 
distinction are not well founded. An alternative set of 
assumptions are that (a) all retention measures engage both 
conscious and unconscious components, and (b) drawing on a 
distinct.ion made in the attention literature (see LaBerge F£ 
Samuels, 197~; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977), retrieval involves both automatic and consciously-
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controlled processes. Explaining performance in terms of 
automatic and consciously-controlled retrieval processes 
does not assume such a rigid correspondence between 
awareness and intention. Automatic influences of memory 
would be expected to occur in the presence of awareness and 
intention (Bargh, 1990). Furthermore, these assumptions 
encourage research designed to separate conscious from 
unconscious processes within a single task. 
If we assume that conscious and unconscious processes 
are engaged in all task environments, the question facing 
memory researchers is how to separate these two aspects of 
performance. Experiment 2 attempted to separate conscious 
from unconscious retrieval processes by 
time available for making recognition 
manipulations of attention (Jacoby et 
manipulating 
decisions. 
al., 1989), 
the 
Like 
fast 
recognition decisions were assumed to prevent the use of 
reconstructive retrieval strategies, 
influences of memory unopposed. 
modality effect at the short 
interpretation. 
thus leaving automatic 
The finding of a large 
delay supports this 
However, the position that retention tests are not 
process-pure applies to the response signal procedure as 
well as indirect measures. It is doubtful that responses at 
the short delay were purely automatic or unintentional. 
However, by placing conscious and unconscious processes in 
opposition (Experiment 3), independent evidence was found 
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that consciously-controlled retrieval processes were 
considerably attenuated at the short delay. Although more 
quantitative techniques are required, this methodology 
allows clear conclusions to be drawn concerning the nature 
of unconscious processes within a task. 
The Nature of Unconscious Retrieval Processes 
Taken together, the results of the three experiments 
reported here are consistent with the following conclusions. 
(1) Unconscious retrieval processes are sensitive to prior 
conceptual operations. (2) Unconscious retrieval processes 
influence performance on direct, as well as indirect, 
measures of memory. (3) On tasks which do not make 
reference to a prior experience (i.e., indirect measures), 
effects of prior conceptual operations depend on the 
reinstatement of contextual details present at study. (~) 
Unconscious retrieval processes are generally faster than 
conscious retrieval processes; however, if the target event 
was only superficially (e.g., non-semantically) processed, 
responding may be based on familiarity regardless of 
retrieval time. The fourth point is more of a hypothesis 
than a conclusion. Regardless, it is consistent with the 
results of Experiments 2 and 3 and appears to account for 
certain accuracy and response-latency differences between 
semantic and non-semantic conditions. This issue was 
discussed above (Experiments 2 and 3, Discussion) and will 
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not be addressed here. The second point is addressed in the 
following section on recognition memory. The first and 
third points, and their relation to other empirical work, 
are discussed below. 
The major assumption underlying the present project was 
that unconscious retrieval processes are influenced by 
previous conceptual operations; however, such influences 
require a retrieval environment that reinstates aspects of 
the original encoding context. The effect of prior 
conceptual operations may only become apparent if the 
original study context is recovered at test (Jacoby & Craik, 
1979). On a direct measure of memory, retrieval cues 
(including instructions) specify a target episode; thus, the 
original study context can be intentionally recreated by the 
subject. With indirect measures, no past 
therefore no specific context, is referenced. 
episode, and 
In order to 
observe the effects of previous conceptual processing, the 
prior (i.e., target) context must be (re)created in the test 
environment. 
According to this position, previous failures to obtain 
semantic encoding effects on indirect measures (e.g.,· Graf & 
Mandler, 1984; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, 1983a, 1983b) 
are explained by the discrepancy between the items presented 
and the task demands required at encoding and test. 
Typically, 
processing 
unrelated word lists are used and, 
demands, the retrieval tasks 
in terms of 
bear little 
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similarity to the encoding tasks. Experiment 1 attempted to 
remove this discrepancy through the use of categorized word 
lists. It was hypothesized that semantic categories would 
provide a study context which could by recreated at test by 
presentation of category exemplars. Task performance could 
then benefit from previous processing that drew attention to 
categorical membership. In line with this analysis, the 
semantic orienting task of category-classification produced 
higher completion performance than pleasantness-rating and 
the non-semantic letter scanning task. The goal of this 
section is to determine if this theoretical framework can be 
extended to other studies which have found conceptual 
effects on indirect measures. 
The generation effect refers to superior memory 
performance on self-generated material in comparison to 
similar matreial that is externally provided (Slamecka & 
Graf, 1978). Generation effects are typically found on 
direct measures of memory; however, like investigations of 
semantic processing, a number of studies have found that the 
usual mnemonic benefit of self-generated material does not 
obtain with indirect measures (e.g., Jacoby, 1983b; 
Schwartz, 1989). Generation requires the subject to provide 
information not present in the stimulus, often in accordance 
with a predefined semantic context (e.g., antonym, synonym, 
sentence fragment); generation can therefore be considered a 
conceptual operation. Thus, three recent studies which have 
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obtained generation effects on indirect measures are 
relevant to the present project. 
Gardiner (1988; see also Gardiner, 1989; Gardiner et 
al., 1990) found an effect of generation on the indirect 
measure of fragment-completion, but only with test fragments 
that were identical to those used for generating words at 
study. A similar finding was obtained by Toth and Hunt 
(1990, Experiment 1) on a word-identification task. In 
contrast to read words, generated words were more often 
identified when test stimuli were presented as fragments; 
when complete words were used, reading and generation 
produced equivalent levels of identification. Toth and Hunt 
(1990, Experiments 2 and 3) also found that identification 
of complete words can benefit more from generation than 
reading if a previously studied context cue is presented 
prior to an identification trial (note 7). Blaxton (1989) 
also found an effect of generation, using general knowledge 
questions (e.g., "what metal makes up 10% of yellow gold?") 
as the indirect ("implicit") measure of memory. Like the 
majority of studies on generation, Blaxton had subjects 
generate target items in the presence of semantically 
related cues (e.g., "TIN- C-----"). 
All of these studies are consistent with the hypothesis 
that unconscious retrieval processes engage prior conceptual 
operations if there is contextual overlap between the 
encoding and retrieval environments. What differentiates 
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these studies from others which have failed to find 
generation effects (e.g., Jacoby, 1983b) is the specificity 
of perceptual information and/or the processing demands made 
at study and test. For example, in Jacoby (1983b), words at 
study were never presented visually and were generated in 
the presence of semantic context cues; test words, however, 
were presented visually and without semantic context. In 
contrast, test conditions in the three studies demonstrating 
generation effects were contextually similar to those at 
encoding. What differentiates these three studies from each 
other is whether the contextual similarity was perceptual 
(Gardiner, 1989; Toth & Hunt, 1990, Experiment 1) or 
conceptual (Blaxton, 1989; Toth & Hunt, Experiments 2 and 3) 
in nature. The more interesting case would appear to be 
that of perceptual similarity; there, no conceptual 
operations are initiated prior to presentation of the test 
item. Nevertheless, like the use of semantic context cues, 
a previously experienced perceptual pattern can result in 
the automatic transfer of prior conceptual operations used 
in the generation process (note 8). 
The finding of "implicit memory for new associations" 
(Graf & Schacter, 1985) can also be interpreted within this 
framework. Research in this area has shown that word-stems 
are more often completed with previously studied, as opposed 
to non-studied, words, but only when tested in the presence 
of the identical context cue used at study. Interestingly, 
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this effect appears to be dependent on elaborative 
processing of the cue-target pair (Schacter & Graf, 1986) 
and is modality specific (Schacter & Graf, 1989). Also, the 
effect has been demonstrated with amnesic subjects who show 
little conscious recollection of the study material (Graf & 
Schacter, 1985; but see Shimamura & Squire, 1989). All of 
these findings are consistent with the assumption that 
unintentional retrieval can be 
conceptual operations if the 
influenced 
retrieval 
by prior 
environment 
reinstates aspects of the encoding context in which those 
operations were originally performed. 
One difference between the studies reviewed above and 
Experiment 1 of the present project is whether contextual 
specificity was a characteristic of individual test-items or 
of the complete retrieval task. Studies of the generation 
effect and of new associations have all used unrelated word 
lists and manipulated context locally (i.e., for individual 
items). In contrast, Experiment 1 attempted to induce a 
more test-wide or global processing context by using 
semantically related (i.e., categorized) stimuli. Other 
experiments which can be viewed as manipulating test-wide 
context were performed by Jacoby (1983a). Performance 
facilitation in word ("perceptual") identification was 
enhanced when the test list contained 90%, as opposed to 
10%, of previously studied words (see also, Allen & Jacoby, 
1990). In another experiment, which investigated 
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facilitation effects over a five-day period (Jacoby, 1983a), 
identification performance was larger if the test list 
contained only items studied on the fifth day, than if they 
were mixed with old items from previous days. Both of these 
effects require explanations that go beyond perceptual 
repetition. Like the effect of semantic processing found in 
Experiment 1 of the present study, enhanced performance 
appears to be mediated by contextual reinstatement. Note, 
however, that in Experiment 1 the list context (i.e., number 
of items and categories) was equivalent for all subjects; 
contextual reinstatement was more in terms of processing 
requiremehts between study and test. 
In this regard, three other studies are relevant. 
Oliphant (1983) found that, unlike words presented in a 
study list, words presented as part of a preexperimental 
questionanaire or as instructions did not facilitate 
performance in a subsequent lexical decision task. A 
similar pattern of results was reported by MacLeod (1989) 
using fragment completion; although target words embedded in 
a meaningful passage produced facilitation relative to non-
presented words, they did so much less than words presented 
as part of a to-be-learned list. MacLeod (1989) concluded 
that " ... context plays a critical role in priming: As a word 
moves from being contextually bound in meaningful discourse 
to being isolated in a list, its probability of priming 
increases" (p. 398). 
-----~---- ~ --~---~ 
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That context plays a critical role in mediating the 
effects of 
the presen·t 
focuses on 
prior experience ("priming") is in accord with 
framework. However, MacLeod's conclusion 
contextual factors at encoding without 
considering the importance of contextual factors at 
retrieval. That words isolated on a study list show the 
highest level of "priming" would be expected on an indirect 
retention measure which itself contains little meaningful 
structure. The present approach suggests that if the 
context associated 
retrieval, even 
with meaningful text were available at 
"contextually bound" words would show 
performance facilitation. 
This interpretation was confirmed in a study by Levy 
and Kirsner (1989; see also Kasserman et al., 1987; Franks 
et al., 1982) which suggests a broader interpretation of the 
effects of prior experience. They manipulated the surface 
characteristics of meaningful passages and word-lists in 
order to study word- and text-level transfer on indirect 
measures of memory. Replicating Oliphant (1983), they found 
that words embedded in natural text did not facilitate 
performance on a subsequent measure of perceptual 
identification; words presented in isolation, however, did 
facilitate identification performance, the magnitude of 
which varied with the similarity of surface characteristics 
from study to test. More importantly, when the complete 
passages were re-presented at test and the indirect measure 
was rereading time, performance 
significantly facilitated and varied 
(reading 
with 
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time) was 
surface-level 
similarity. Thus, whether a prior experience influences 
subsequent performance depends critically on the context in 
which that performance is assessed; transfer is most 
apparent when the context reinstates aspects of the original 
processing episode. Similar points can be made concerning 
spontaneous transfer in problem solving (Adams et al., 1988; 
Lockhart et al., 1988). 
Cognitive psychologists have emphasized the importance 
of understanding memory in terms of an interaction between 
encoding and retrieval (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977; 
Tulving, 1983). However, relatively few studies have 
attempted to explicate the role of contextual or 
organizational factors in indirect retrieval environments. 
This is a curious state of affairs. Outside of the 
psychological 
absence of a 
laboratory, 
meaningfully 
retrieval rarely occurs in the 
structured (i.e., organized) 
context. Given a form of memory that is extremely sensitive 
to contextual factors, yet often occurs with little 
intentional control over their nature, an emphasis on the 
structure 
important. 
of retrieval environments seems particularly 
Automatic Processes in Recognition Memory: Theoretical 
Implications and Relation to Other Forms of Memory 
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Experiments 2 and 3 used a response signal procedure to 
investigate unconscious retrieval processes in recognition. 
Recognition was chosen on the basis of empirical and 
theoretical work (Gillund & Shiffrin, 198~; Jacoby & Dallas, 
1981; Mandler, 1981) suggesting that it involves both 
conscious and unconscious components. In line with the 
assumption that retention measures are not process-pure (see 
above), recognition was fcund to depend on retrieval 
processes that can be descibed as automatic, unconscious, 
and unintentional. When the time avialable for retrieval 
was curtailed (Experiment 2, short-delay), recognition was 
marked by a substantial modality effect, an effect 
associated with indirect ("implicit") measures of memory. 
Nevertheless, a large effect of orienting task was obtained 
at all points in the recognition process. A similar result 
was found in Experiment 3, which employed an exclusion 
methodology to rule out the possibility of conscious 
mediation (cf. Jacoby et al., 1989; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 
1989). Although subjects were given direct instructions to 
reject a particular class of items, prior semantic 
processing resulted in a high percentage of false 
recognitions when retrieval time was restricted. 
The implications of these findings for 
conceptualizations of retention measures and the nature of 
unconscious 
purpose of 
devoted to 
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retrieval processes were discussed above. The 
this section is twofold. The first half is 
relating the present findings to current 
theoretical approaches, specifically in terms of recognition 
memory. Note, however, that theoretical accounts of 
recognition are part of larger theoretical systems designed 
to capture a variety of phenomena. Thus, any required 
change in models of recognition will have ramifications for 
other aspects of theory. The second half of this section is 
devoted to what the present findings imply for memory more 
broadly conceived. Generally, what is the relationship 
between automatic responding in recognition and on indirect 
measures of memory? Also, what does the presence of 
automatic components in recognition imply for other forms of 
direct memory such as free recall? Speculation on these 
issues conclude this project. 
Two of the most influential theories for explaining 
memory (for reviews, see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; 
Schacter, 1987) are the multiple memory systems approach 
(Tulving, 1983; Tulving & Schacter, 1990) and the processing 
approach (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987b; Roediger et al., 1989; 
see also Jacoby, 1983a). The memory systems approach is a 
structuralist position which proposes that the effects of 
prior experience are mediated by different underlying 
systems. In its most recent manifestation, memory is 
described as consisting of an episodic system, ~ semantic 
---------------- - ------
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system, a procedural system, and a perceptual representation 
system (PRS); the latter is described as a "presemantic" 
system that "comprises several subsystems, including word 
form, structural description, and other subsystems" (Tulving 
& Schacter, 1990, p. 305). The processing view is a more 
functional approach and suggests that memory be understood 
in terms of the distinction between data-driven and 
conceptually driven processes. Conceptually driven 
processes are described as subject-initiated activities 
concerned with the meaning of an event. Elaboration of a 
study item and mental reconstruction of prior episqde are 
conceptually driven processes. Data-driven processes are 
initiated and guided by the perceptual information provided 
in study or test materials. The results of Experiments 2 
and 3 seem to require the modification of both of these 
theoretical approaches. 
The theoretical strategy of the processing approach has 
been to classify encoding operations and retention measures 
in terms of conceptually driven and data-driven processes. 
Based on the principle of transfer appropriate processing 
(Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977), memory is said to be a 
function of the extent to which retrieval conditions 
recapitulate operations performed during the original 
(target) experience. In a sense, this position l.S 
indisputable. 
whether this 
The question of theoretical interest is 
principle is properly explicated by the 
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distinction between these two forms of processing. In order 
for the distinction to be useful, it should be possible, at 
least in principle, to isolate data-driven and conceptually 
driven processes. Note that this requirement is analogous 
to the one demanded of the distinction between implicit and 
explicit memory (see above). If the two cannot be separated 
within a task, clear conclusions cannot be drawn concerning 
the mediation of performance and thus the distinction 
becomes theoretically impenetrable. 
The present recognition results suggest just such an 
impenetrability. Keeping all other experimental factors 
constant, manipulations of retrieval time both induced and 
eliminated the effects of a shift in presentation modality. 
This would appear to constitute an empirical isolation of 
data-driven and conceptually driven processes. However, 
substantial effects of prior conceptual processing were 
apparent at both points in retrieval suggesting that the two 
forms of processing cannot entirely be separated. Similar 
demonstrations of the confluence of surface-related and 
conceptual factors 
Hunt & Toth (1990; 
Mitchell, 1978, 
have been reported in other studies. 
see also Hunt & Elliott, 1980; Hunt & 
1982) showed that orthographic 
distinctiveness, a variable associated with data-driven 
processing, can influence performance on free recall, a 
highly conceptually driven test. Conversely, word 
identification, the paradigmatic data-driven measure, can be 
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affected by prior conceptual operations (Toth & Hunt, 1990; 
see also Gardiner, 1989). Additionally, test expectancy (a 
self-initiated, conceptually driven process) can influence 
both direct and indirect memory performance (Neill, Beck, 
Bottalico, & Molloy, 1990). These results are consistent 
with the assumption that data-driven and conceptually driven 
processes are highly interactive and involved in all task 
environments. 
The notion that psychological processes are highly 
interactive also suggests inadequacies in the memory systems 
view, although here there are a number of theoretical 
options. One possibility is that perceptual information is 
stored in the episodic memory system. This would seem to be 
demanded by the modality effect obtained in Experiment 2. 
The problem with this interpretation is that recognition is 
usually insensitive to manipulations of surface features 
(e.g., Roediger & Blaxton, 1987a). A second possibility is 
that conceptual information is stored in the procedural 
system, the 
or both. 
perceptual-representation (word-form?) system, 
This possibility is suggested by the effects of 
encoding found in all three experiments. The 
with this view is that the PRS is supposedly a 
semantic 
problem 
"presemantic" system which does not code for meaning. Thus, 
in general, both of these possibilities seem untenable 
because they violate the very rationale for a theoretical 
separation among memory systems; namely, that the various 
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systems store different forms of information. 
A third possibility is that a study experience produces 
memory traces in different systems which then interact to 
determine performance. For example, the episodic/semantic 
system (note 9) might record the operations involved in an 
elaborate encoding of a word whereas the PRS (word-form) 
system might record the physical characteristics (e.g., 
presentation modality) of the word. The problem with this 
possibility is the difficulty of explaining the highly 
interactive nature of retrieval. Experiment 2 demonstrated 
that conceptual information was available early in the 
recognition process, 
memory. However, the 
implicating the operation of episodic 
large modality effects indicate a 
strong perceptual component. Additionally, Experiment 3 
showed that meaningful task instructions were not in effect 
at the same time that conceptual information influenced 
responding. Taken together, these results suggest that if 
memory is properly conceptualized as a number of modular 
systems, they are highly interactive and flexible, almost to 
the point of appearing unitary. 
In contrast to the theoretical separation of memory 
systems or perception and conception, the present results 
are nicely captured by viewing performance as a function of 
automatic and consciously-controlled processes (see LaBerge 
& Samuels, 1974; 
Schneider, 1977). 
Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & 
Dual-process theories of recognition 
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(Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 
-1980) propose that recognition decisions can be based on 
either familiarity or recollection; familiarity can be 
viewed as a fast, automatic process whereas recollection is 
a consciously-controlled, "search" process. The present 
results are generally consistent with this account. Fast 
recognition decisions prevented the use of consciously-
controlled retrieval processes, forcing reponses to be made 
primarily on the basis of familiarity. Unlike consciously-
controlled retrieval, which is dependent on the 
identification of contextual details, familiarity is a 
function of the overall similarity between the original 
(study) and subsequent (target) event. Thus, performance at 
the short delay was partly determined by perceptual 
similarity, resulting in a large modality effect (Experiment 
2) and a high level of false recognitions (Experiment 3). 
At the long delay, consciously-controlled processes could be 
mobilized to override the discrepancy in perceptual 
information (Experiment 2) or reject items on the basis of a 
conscious, intentionally-set criterion (Experiment 3). 
The dual-process model would therefore appear to 
provide the most appropriate framework for understanding the 
present set of recognition results. 
orienting task suggest the need 
conceptualizations of familiarity. 
earlier proposals (Jacoby and Dallas, 
However, the effects of 
to expand previous 
In contrast to the 
1981; Mandler, 1980), 
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familiarity is not a function of perceptual similarity 
alone; conceptual processes (or representations) also 
contribute to performance. 
The identification of unconscious retrieval processes 
in recognition 
namely, what 
processes in 
raises interesting 
is the relationship 
this task and those 
theoretical questions: 
between 
involved 
unconscious 
on indirect 
measures of memory; also, do similar unconscious processes 
underlie performance on other direct measures such as free 
recall? One approach to these questions is to assume that 
automatic influences of prior experience are the common 
component on direct and indirect measures. 
this view, the difference between direct 
measures is that t.he former involve an 
According to 
and indirect 
additional, 
consciously-controlled 
experience is to be 
component that specifies how prior 
utilized. On indirect measures, 
utlization of past experience is constrained by the nature 
of test stimuli (e.g., completion of fragments or stems; 
identification of degraded stimuli). 
Evidence supporting this formulation is suggested by 
the relationship between familiarity and perceptual fluency 
- that is, the ease with which items are perceived. 
Perceptual fluency can be viewed as an automatic influence 
of memory in that it assessed relatively quickly and does 
not depend on awareness of, or intention to retrieve, a 
prior event. The notion of perceptual fluency was 
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originally derived from observations in word identification 
experiments. Anecdotal reports by subjects in those 
experiments indicated that previously presented words 
appeared to remain on the screen longer than new words even 
though, in actuality, all words had been presented for the 
same duration (Jacoby & Kelly, 1987). These reports were 
confirmed in later experiments which varied the presentation 
duration of old and new words; old words were consistently 
judged as staying on the screen longer than new words (Hunt 
& Toth, 1990; Witherspoon & Allen, 1985). 
Jacoby and associates (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & 
Witherspoon, 1982) have suggested that the feeling of 
familiarity be viewed as an attribution based on relative 
perceptual fluency. The idea here is that, when required to 
judge the old/new status of test words, subjects are 
sensitive to how easily an item is processed; differences in 
processing are interpreted as reflecting the effects of 
prior experience··.· In line with this assumption, perceptual 
fluency has been implicated in mediating recognition 
decisions (Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985). Recently, 
Jacoby & Whitehouse (1989) showed that false recognitions 
can be produced by subliminal presentation of test items 
just prior to their supralimnal test presentation. 
Apparently, processing of a word presented above threshold 
was facilitated by the earlier, subliminal presentation; 
because subjects were not aware of the subliminal 
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presentation, the fluency with which the test item was 
processed was interpreted as due to an earlier study 
presentation. These observation suggest that the automatic 
component in recognition memory is best conceptualized in 
terms of processing fluency; familiarity is an attribution 
based on processing differences coupled with task demands 
(Jacoby et al., 1989). 
Fluent processing may also mediate performance on 
indirect measures. The subjective experience of a reduction 
in background noise when hearing a previously presented 
sentence (Jacoby et al., 1988) can be interpreted as due to 
the relative ease of perceiving old, as opposed to new, 
sentences. Similarly, previously presented non-famous names 
are more likely to be judged as famous than names which have. 
not been previously presented (Jacoby et al., 1989). The 
interesting aspect of this effect is that fluent processing 
could have been attributed to the effects prior experience 
if direct memory instructions had been provided; instead, 
differences in stimulus processing were attributed to 
dimensions specified in the indirect task instructions 
(i.e., fame or noise levels). 
Fluent processing has also been implicated in mediating 
performance on more standard indirect tests such as lexical 
decision and naming (Masson & Freedman, 1990). 
Interestingly, these researchers provide evidence that 
fluent processing in these tasks does not reflect enhanced 
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perceptual performance but rather depends "on the generation 
of a consistent semantic interpretation" which can be 
"highly context specific" (p. 371). Similarly, Toth and 
Hunt (1990) suggested that a process of "conceptual fluency" 
might underlie performance on ~asks which are contextually 
similar to prior episodes in which conceptual processes were 
used. These interpretations could easily be extended to 
incorporate indirect measures that are based on semantic 
relations such as general knowledge questions (Blaxton, 
1989) and category production (Graf et al., 1985). 
The recognition results of Experiments 2 and 3 suggest 
the operation of both perceptual and conceptual fluency. 
The modality effect in Experiment 2 indicates that 
presentation of an old test word recruited prior perceptual 
operations; that is, words presented visually at study 
resulted in more fluent processing at test than words 
presented 
orienting 
conceptual 
aurally at study. However, the 
task in both experiments indicates 
operations were also recruited. 
effect of 
that prior 
Additional 
evidence for a process of conceptual fluency is provided by 
the fact that an effect of orienting task at the short delay 
was as apparent for old auditory words as it was for old 
visual words. Because all test words were presented 
visually, perceptual factors would seem to be ruled out in 
accounting for the obtained differences in performance. 
These findings suggest a general model for the 
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processes underlying recognition memory. Under appropriate 
conditions, presentation of a previously .experienced item 
recruits prior perceptual and conceptual operations 
performed on that item. Recruitment of these operations 
affects the ease with which the test item is processed. If 
the current test item, relative to other test items, is 
fluently processed, a feeling of familiarity will result 
which can be used as the basis for a recognition decision. 
However, if the relative differences in processing fluency 
are not discriminable, and/or if there is sufficient time 
(and reason) for a more analytic judgment, consciously-
controlled retrieval of the contextual details associated 
with the study experience can also be used as the basis for 
recognition. 
A theoretical framework based on the distinction 
between automatic and consciously-controlled processes may 
also be applicable to recall. Recently, Jacoby and 
Hollingshead (1990) proposed a generate-recognize model of 
free-recall. An important difference between their approach 
and earlier generate/recognize models (e.g., Anderson & 
Bowers, 1972) is that the latter relied on abstract 
knowledge structures (e.g., associative networks) for the 
generation of candidates for recall. In contrast, Jacoby 
and Hollingshead (1990) propose that memory for prior 
episodes constrains the generation process. Essentially, 
retrieval cues which reference a specific episode result in 
---- --------·---- ------
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the fluent generation of items from that episode or similar 
episodes. Which items are actually "recalled" (i.e., 
output) will depend on the results of the recognition 
process which can be based on either familiarity, 
recollection, or both. Analogous to the automatic 
component in recognition, some candidates for recall may be 
generated so fluently that a consciously-controlled 
recognition check is not performed, thus resulting in the 
"recall" of unrecognized words. Results from two 
experiments were consistent with predictions based on this 
model (Jacoby and Hollinghead, 1990). 
This model suggests that, like recognition, recall can 
be related to indirect measures through the concept of 
fluency; fluency, in turn, is a result of automatic 
retrieval processes which are determined by contextual 
factors present in the cue environment. In this 
conceptualization, cued-recall shares generative processes 
with indirect measures such as stem-completion and general 
knowledge questions; cued-recall differs from these tests 
only in requiring an additional recognition process 
& Hollingshead, 1990). 
(Jacoby 
Generation of response candidates can be viewed as a 
form of conceptual fluency (see above). Note, however, that 
recall invariably occurs within a context that contains both 
perceptual and conceptual features. Thus, recall should not 
be viewed as invplving only conceptually-driven operations 
(Hunt & Toth, 
environmental) 
instructional) 
1990). Both the 
and conceptual 
context can 
(e.g. ' 
influence 
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perceptual (e.g., 
cue information/ 
the level of 
performance. Thus, processing of context, either as 
provided in the retrieval environment or as self-generated 
by the subject, can be viewed as a "stage setting" operation 
(Bransford, McCarrel, Franks, & Nitsch, 1977) for the 
generation of candidates which meet the criteria defined by 
retrieval cues. 
Obviously, the framework detailed above is speculative. 
However, the data presented here, as well as the results 
from a number of previous studies, are consistent with the 
assumptions made in the Introduction. Implicit and explicit 
memory are not mutually exclusive categories. Both 
conscious (controlled) and unconscious (automatic) processes 
are present in all task environments. In addition, memory 
performance depends upon the interaction of perceptual and 
conceptual processes used in the past and recruited in the 
present; contextual factors will often determine the nature 
of this interaction. These assumptions can be viewed as 
laying the groundwork for a unified theory of memory. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. It is interesting to note that even this characteristic 
does not always apply. A number of experiments on 
"implicit" memory use procedures which make the relationship 
between the current task and prior study experiences 
obvious. Indeed, instructions to subjects in some of these 
experiments explicitly refer to this relationship. 
2. Direct measures of memory are those which make reference 
to a specific past episode in the history of the subject. 
Performance is measured directly, in terms of the 
information retrieved from that episode. Indirect measures 
of memory are those which do not include references to prior 
events. Performance is measured indirectly, in terms of the 
amount of faciliation in the task that can be attributed to 
a specific past episode. 
3. Whether retrieval is intentional may have less to do 
with the instructions than with the nature of the task 
itself. Although little research has been done concerning 
these issues, factors which might encourage intentional 
retrieval include the difficulty of reponding to (e.g., 
completing) individual test items and the similarity of the 
current task to past events. A task might act as a 
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persuasive retrieval cue for a past episode if similar items 
are present or similar processes required. 
In line with the principles of encoding specificity and 
transfer-appropriate processing, it seems quite possible 
that the conditions for demonstrating an effect of previous 
conceptual operat1ons 
reinstatement of the 
on unintentional retrieval (i.e., 
context available at encoding) may 
often be the same conditions which evoke awareness of a past 
episode. In the majority of studies on "implicit memory", 
subjects may not attempt to retrieve previously learned 
information, not because the instructions do not refer to 
the past 
little 
demands. 
learning episode, but rather 
overlap between that episode 
because there is 
and current task 
~- With few modifications, the arguments against the second 
assumption could easily be applied to the idea that direct 
tests are "conceptually-driven" and indirect tests are 
"data-driven" (Roediger) and to the distinction between 
episodic/semantic memory and "perceptual-respresentation 
systems" (Tulving & Schacter, 1990). 
5. As argued below, task dissociations cannot fill this 
role. Dissociations can only indicate that two tasks do not 
completely share the same component processes. Regardless 
of the extent of conscious-control, dissociations can be 
produced by any dissimilarity in process, however trivial. 
-------------------------~ 
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Recall and recognition are often dissociated as a function 
of experimental manipulations (e.g., frequency), yet 
presumably, both engage conscious, intentional retrieval 
processes. 
6. This observation was made by Larry Jacoby. 
7. Cued-recall (i.e., intentional retrieval) of study items 
was ruled out as an explanation of this finding. 
8. This point is relevant to theoretical accounts of 
generation effects on indirect measures. According to the 
processing view (Blaxton, 1989; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; 
Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989) generation effects should 
be found only on retention measures which require 
conceptually-driven processing. The use of semantic context 
cues can be interpreted as engaging conceptually-driven 
processing, therefore accout1ting for the generation effects 
obtained_ in some studies (Blaxton, 1989; Toth & Hunt, 1990, 
Experiments 2 and 3). However, it is unclear how this 
approach can account for generation effects when test items 
are presented in isolation as was the case with Gardiner 
(1989) using fragment completion and Toth & Hunt (1990, 
Experiment 1) using word identification. Both of these 
measures have been classified as data-driven. 
9. The term 
shorthand for 
"episodic/semantic system" is used as a 
"either the episodic system, the semantic 
~---- ----- -------- ----- ---
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system, or the interaction between the two." Presumably, 
both systems are required for the the encoding and retrieval 
of an elaborated study item (Tulving, 1983). However, the 
present arguments s~ply require that these systems, which 
are involved in episodic memory for prior meaningful 
processing, are distinguished from the procedural and 
perceptual-representation systems, which do not store 
conceptual information. For the same reason, the latter two 
systems do not require separate treatment. 
~· ~-- -·-· -~·. -~--~-- -----· ~ ------------~-~-
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Appendix A. Words and word-fragments used in Experiment 1. 
Group A: 
Animals 
horse 
tiger 
elephant 
mouse 
squirrel 
donkey 
antelope 
monkey 
Occupations 
doctor 
lawyer 
teacher 
dentist 
engineer 
plumber 
merchant 
farmer 
Group B: 
Birds 
robin 
sparrow 
cardinal 
canary 
parrot 
falcon 
chicken 
penguin 
Insects 
spider 
beetle 
roach 
termite 
cricket 
caterpillar 
centipede 
locust 
h-r-e 
t-g-r 
e-e-h-n-
m-us-
s-u--r-1 
d-nk-y 
a-t-1-p-
m-nk-y 
d-c-o-
1-w--r 
t-a-h-r 
d-n-i-t 
e-g-ne-r 
p-u-b-r 
m-r-h-nt 
fa-me-
r-b-n 
s-a-r-w 
c-r-in-1 
c-n-ry 
p-r-ot 
f-1-on 
c-i-k-n 
p-n-u-n 
-p-d-r 
b-e-1-
ro--h 
t-rm-t-
c-i-k-t 
c-t-r-i-1-r 
c-n-i-e-e 
1-c-s-
Alcoholic Beverages 
whiskey 
bourbon 
scotch 
brandy 
champagne 
vermouth 
martini 
sherry 
w--sk-
b-u-b-n 
s-ot-h 
b-an-y 
c-a-p-g-e 
v-r-o-t-
m-r-i-i 
s-er-y 
Musical Instruments 
trumpet 
violin 
clarinet 
flute 
guitar 
trombone 
harmonica 
accordion 
Weapons 
spear 
missile 
arrow 
slingshot 
revolver 
grenade 
t.orpedo 
explosive 
Fruits 
apple 
orange 
banana 
peach 
cherry 
strawberry 
cantaloupe 
raisin. 
t-u-p-t 
v-o-i-
c-a-i-e-
f-ut-
g-i-a-
t-o-b-n-
h-r-o-i-a 
a-c-r-i-n 
-pe-r 
-i-s-le 
a-r-w 
s-i-g-h-t 
r-v--v-r 
g-e-a-e 
t-r-e-o 
e-p-o-i-e 
a-p-e 
o-a-g-
b-n-n-
p-a-h 
c--rr-
s-r-w-e-r-
c-n-a-o-p-
r-i-i-
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Appendix B. Words used in Experiment 2. 
Targets Dis tractors 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2 
trench grape sleet broil 
pillow towel salad comb 
bucket rocket mouse grief 
grease globe couch cake 
dice chill bark thunder 
shower flag arrow reward 
pipe brick flame stove 
clock soap lamp meadow 
flower joke planet candle 
swift lunch garage drug 
jacket bride museum butter 
blind snake tool powder 
gold yellow brush smoke 
truck smile stone lake 
rifle dream rain shelter 
dust dress bottle knife 
judge boat coffee match 
bank winter touch train 
king rose dinner bridge 
dance glass window doctor 
hotel farm blood radio 
police river game letter 
music mother stage street 
school night water city 
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Appendix C. Words used in Experiment 3. 
Visual Auditory 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 1 Set 2 
trench trash sleet broil 
grape clown comb towel 
kitten vitamin couch globe 
laundry throne bark chill 
trumpet pillow stove tennis 
bucket rocket flame meadow 
castle sunshine lamp pipe 
diamond grease clock planet 
mouse salad garage soap 
grief poison joke flower 
puzzle cake drug butter 
dice thunder powder swift 
arrow reward museum lunch 
shower flag jacket bride 
candle brick bench noise 
dance dinner tool smoke 
bridge marriage snake brush 
doctor glass blind gold 
energy sunday lake yellow 
machine horse truck smile 
window radio stone rifle 
farm blood dream dress 
hotel game dust shelter 
student letter rain frame 
stage police boat bottle 
military river knife judge 
mother music coffee match 
money street train bank 
city school winter rose 
night water touch king 
